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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation: Djibouti Code of Conduct, an instrument to suppress piracy in 
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 
Degree:  Master of Science 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden signed on the 29
th
 January 
2009 provides for Member States to cooperate in their efforts to repress acts of piracy in 
the region. This followed hijacking of MT Sirius Star laded with Crude oil worth 100 
million USD and MV Faina carrying a consignment of military armaments which 
included 33 battle tanks.  
This dissertation examines the Code with emphasis on the concept of the principal 
articles in the areas of embarkation of law enforcement officers, information sharing 
mechanism and review of domestic legislations on piracy. An evaluation of existing 
cooperative mechanisms in the region is included for the purposes of identifying 
potential partners who could provide synergy and minimize duplication in the course of 
realization of these objectives.  
After analyzing the Code concept through literature review of similar practices and 
piracy cases prosecuted in the region, the dissertation concludes the Code is sufficient in 
intention and text save for the political will, which will have to be aroused and 
maintained through rigorous campaigns, such as IMO 2011 theme “piracy: orchestrating 
the response” to raise awareness on the negative effects of piracy on shipping and 
seafarers, who are subjected to these acts. 
Key words: Piracy, Embarked officers, Information sharing, National legislation, 
Incident reporting, Extradition 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
“The escalating problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia is completely 
unacceptable and requires an urgent and coordinated response” (Ban Ki 
Moon UN Secretary General 2011) 
1.1 Background 
Piracy in the past had been repressed using various state sanctioned means with historical 
records dating as early as the era of the Roman Empire indicating that General Pompey, 
(66BC) used  military to clear piracy in the Mediterranean Sea in record 89 days. 
State sanctioned anti-piracy measures in the Middle Ages by the then powers in Europe 
of England, Denmark and the Netherlands took form of privateering in suppressing 
pirates. The challenges facing use of these groups led to the treaty of Paris in 1856 by 
Britain, France, Prussia Russia, Austria and Turkey which abolished the use of privateers 
as a means of curbing piracy (Roazen, 2010, P 89). 
Different writers have traced different players in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries who used 
military to repress and end piracy citing Napoleon invasion of Malta in 1798, the 
American invasion of the North African Barbary States during President James Madison 
in 1815 and the Lord Exmouth bombardment of Algiers in 1816. These military 
campaigns and the total mastery of seas strategy adopted by US and Great Britain closed 
the chapter on piracy and relegated it to movie theatres at least for most of the 20
th
 
century (Green, 2010, p 80). 
Piracy incidents resurfaced again in the mid-80s in South East Asia following the end of 
the cold war which had been superseded by the two world wars and birth of independent 
former colonies in Asia and Africa. The timing of this resurgence found the United States 
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of America, the only superpower whose policy and strategy had shifted from military and 
political ideologies to development of commerce, human rights and democracy. 
With war risk insurance premium being imposed on shipping in the South East Asia 
region, the littoral states agreed to tackle the piracy problem through various initiatives 
adopted within regional forums, such as the Association of South East Asian Nation 
(ASEAN) and extra regional stakeholders including shipping companies and concerned 
nations like Japan and the USA. Notable among these initiatives is the Tokyo Appeal of 
March 2000 which culminated into signing of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in November 
2004 (Tamara, 2000, p 163). 
This agreement ushered in a new concept of regional solution to a regional problem 
worth emulating. IMO began mobilizing the Horn of Africa and West Indian Ocean 
regional countries as early as 2006 in Sana’a Yemen and Tanzania in 2008 to address 
piracy in the region. These meetings culminated in adoption of the Code of Conduct 
concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct) on 29
th
 January 2009 in 
Djibouti. Nine countries out of the 21 eligible signed the Code on the adoption day with 
others following in different times making a total of 18 by July 2011.  
“In 2011 IMO will focus on promoting further co-operation between and 
among states, region and organizations in reducing the risk of attacks on 
ships through a variety of mechanisms including information sharing; 
coordination of military and civil efforts; development and implementation of 
regional initiatives such the Djibouti Code of Conduct”. (Efthimios 
Mitropoulos- IMO Secretary General) 
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1.2 Objectives 
This research aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the Djibouti Code of conduct in 
addressing piracy in Somalia by analyzing the core concept of the Code based on its 
main articles. The research will also identify existing arrangements which provide 
opportunities for synergy and partnership. 
1.3. Research questions 
The research will seek to answer the following questions to reach a conclusion: 
1. How big a problem is Somali piracy and how is it organized and perpetuated? 
2. What were the motives and the intentions of the framers of different articles 
of the Code? 
3. How practical is the embarkation of law enforcement officers taking into 
account regional capability of the Djibouti Code participants and what options 
exist which could make up for the incapacity? 
4. On information sharing what information systems exist in the region and what 
is available in the market that could inform the choice of the system?  
5. On review of domestic legislation what inadequacies exist in the domestic 
laws of the regional countries and what can be learned from the piracy cases 
prosecuted in Kenya? 
6. What other cooperative arrangements exist in the region which may provide 
opportunities for partnership and synergy? 
1.4 Scope 
The scope of this research include an analysis of the main articles of Djibouti Code of 
Conduct, its concept and implementation options taking into consideration the existing 
environment in the region in terms of players and known practice elsewhere.  
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1.5 Research Methods 
The research method used in this study is qualitative analysis based on published 
information on piracy available from literature research and data from various piracy 
information centers such as the International Maritime Bureau(IMB), European Union 
Naval Force (EUNAVOR), Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, (MSC-HOA), 
NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) and ReCAAP. 
The research on the Code main features is based on other similar practices such as the 
ship rider practice in anti-narcotics campaigns, existing information sharing mechanisms 
and the maritime domain awareness concept and strategies. The research also includes 
case laws on current prosecution of pirates held in Kenya, theories of cooperation in 
international relations published and various reports to the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) by different United Nations bodies.  
1.6. Organization 
The research is organized into eight chapters where chapter one introduces the logical 
foundation of the research by stating the objectives, research questions and the scope. 
The second chapter reviews piracy literature in trends and evolvement while chapter 
three looks at the Code text. Chapter four, five and six will deal with the three principal 
articles of the Code, which are embarkation of law enforcement officers, information 
sharing and review of national legislation. Chapter seven will explore the regional 
cooperative mechanisms which could provide synergy in the realization of the Code 
objectives. Chapter eight will contain the discussions and conclusions of the research. 
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Chapter 2 
Piracy, origin, evolvement and trends 
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you can win a hundred battles 
without a single loss”. (Sun Tzu Art of War) 
 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 Piracy in general 
Understanding the nature of pirate attacks and their modus operandi is essential before 
informed mitigation measures, such as the cooperative approach advanced by the 
framers of the Djibouti Code can be effectively put in use. This chapter will look at 
pirate attacks in the past and the present with particular emphasis on Somali piracy with 
a view to understanding their organization and operations to enable an in depth 
evaluation of the Code in its overall effectiveness in repressing piracy. Recorded history 
during the Roman Empire has it that piracy was a common criminal act in the 
Mediterranean in the BC and that maritime powers played a role in suppressing these 
criminal acts from the Roman hegemony to the Spanish and Portuguese. The last century 
maritime powers of Britain and US are credited for restoring order in the world oceans. 
The 20th century witnessed the two world wars followed by the cold war era in the 
fifties, sixties and the seventies with two superpower blocks of the United States of 
America and the United Soviet States of Russia dominating the world oceans. The 
collapse of the USSR left the US as the only super power, whose policies and ideologies 
led to reduction of its naval force among other major naval powers (Abhyankar, 2005 p 
225). Piracy incidents started re-emerging in the 1980s in South East Asia and spread to 
other parts of the world oceans with high number of attacks in the turn of the millennium 
recorded in the Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. 
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2.1.2 Response to piracy incidents in South East Asia 
The first international response to the increased piracy incidents and other maritime 
related crimes can be traced to the creation of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 
a specialized division of the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) in 1981 to act as a 
focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and malpractices. It is 
however, the creation of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in 1992 based in Kuala 
Lumpur in Malaysia which brought the world-wide alerts in its reporting of piracy 
incidents and compiling statistics of piracy. Among other things the IMB PRC Centre 
defined piracy as “an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any 
other crime and with the intent or capability force in the furtherance of that act”. This 
definition, however, deviates from UNCLOS probably because the practical purpose is 
to facilitate the collection and analysis of data (Mejia, 2010 p 291).  
The piracy incidents in the region evolved from various maritime crimes in the region 
notably the phantom vessel phenomena in the late 70s and 80s. There were three means 
of acquiring vessels for this kind of operation namely through purchase in the open 
market, creating a new ownership on paper for vessels that were already in the 
possession of the syndicates and hijacking or stealing vessels to order (Abhyankar, 2007 
p 97). 
2.1.3 Trends and Tactics 
The spectrum of these piratical attacks are that at one end, a group of pirates boards a 
vessel with the intention of stealing whatever they can steal such as crew’s personal 
values, cash, ship’s equipment and stores within easy reach. On the extreme end, the 
pirates approach the vessel, fire automatic weapons at the bridge and are extremely 
aggressive when they board and take over the vessel. The crew are transferred to other 
pirate craft or set adrift or executed as the pirates take over the ship and cargo 
(Mukundan, 2010, p 7). 
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The case of MV Alondra Rainbow is a typical example of these extreme cases where the 
general cargo ship was hijacked by a group of pirates, who forcefully took over the 
control and command of the ship in October 22 1999. The pirates transferred the crew 
members to another pirate vessel where they were later transferred to a raft and set 
adrift. The crew was rescued after drifting for about ten days at sea by a fishing boat and 
taken to Phuket in Thailand. 
The vessel was intercepted by the Indian Coast Guard after having changed her name to 
MV Mega Rama. The pirate crew on being intercepted set fire to the documents of MV 
Alondra Rainbow and further attempted to sink the ship by opening the sea chest valves 
to fill the engine room with sea water. The pirates were charged in a Mumbai Court with 
piracy (Venkiteswaran, 2010, p 175). 
2.1.4 Piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa 
This region includes coastlines of Angola, Cameroun, Benin, Guinea, Ghana, Ivory 
Coast and Nigeria. The region according to the 2010 IMB PIC reports recorded the third 
highest reported incidents in the period of 2000 to 2010. These incidents initially 
involved the low level attacks to ships mostly at anchor, but the situation changed from 
2006 particularly in the Niger Delta where more violent attacks have been witnessed. 
Incidents of attacks on supply vessel and oil platforms associated with the political 
armed groups of the Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) became 
common as the militants kept their pressure on the government of Nigeria. This group 
has been involved with kidnapping workers in the oil platforms and demanding ransom. 
This region has recorded high attacks in 2010 and 2011 leading to insurance companies 
imposing war risk premiums at a similar rate to those of Somalia (Payne, 2010, p120). 
2.1.5  Somali Piracy 
For the purposes of this paper the Somali piracy will be considered as those piracy 
incidents perpetuated by members of the Somali community off the seas adjacent to the 
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Somali coast and neighboring areas in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin in the 
Indian Ocean which are covered by the Djibouti Code of Conduct. 
The period preceding the fall of the Siad Barre government of Somalia in 1991 is 
imperative in attempting to understand the genesis of Somali piracy. Incidents of early 
hijacking involved one of the factions fighting the Mogadishu government the Somali 
National Movement (SNM), in an attempt to prevent vessels calling at the Somali ports 
still under the Mogadishu government. 
With the fall of the Barre government in January 1991 there were isolated reports of 
ships coming under attack in the region off Puntland. The attack on MV Bonsella in 
September 1994 by a party of 26 pirates posing as Coast Guards who used the ship as a 
base to attack other ships in the area is vital in attempting to unravel the genesis of 
Somali piracy. The pirates said they would use the ships to apprehend fishing vessels 
operating without licenses. The ship was eventually released after offloading the ship’s 
cargo of aid supplies alongside ship stores and cash and served as the beginning of 
reactions to fishing off the coast of Somalia by fishing community backed by militias. 
Another notable incident involved a Taiwanese trawler, MV Shen Ko in 1997, which 
was captured by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) of the Majarteen Clan, 
who demanded a fine of $800,000 to release the ship, $40,000 for the captain and 
$10,000 for each member of the crew (Murphy, 2010, p. 13) 
An account by one of the pirates on the early attacks to ships points to a rivalry between 
the foreign fishing vessels and the local fishermen. He confessed that in 2003 they 
surrounded a large fishing vessel with 18 crew members, climbed and held the ship for 
two weeks. Somali and Arab mediators stepped in and paid $50,000 as a compensation 
for damaged fishing boats and gears of the local fishermen. To him this came as a 
surprise and inspired the duo to hunting ships (Nigel, 2010, p 148). 
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Many of these early incidents involving mostly fishing vessels seem to have been 
unreported to IMB –PIC and hence the reason why there were no statistical data, 
presumably due to the fact that mostly, it involved fishing vessels near the coast. There 
however, exists literature which point to the fact that these incidents were common  
The earliest appreciable data by International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Information 
Centre (IMB-PIC) reports of piracy attacks in Somalia were in 1995 when 14 incidents 
were recorded in Somalia, while in the Gulf of Aden the first incidents were recorded in 
2000 comprising of 14 incidents. Though the region continued recording incidents 
averaging 10 annually, it did not attract international attention until 2006, when IMB-
PIC statistics recorded Somali piracy incidents exceeded those of other areas, in 
particular Indonesia, which had led the path. The center started issuing warnings on 
ships not scheduled to call Somalia to avoid the Somali coast by at least 50nm This 
warning increased the range to more than 200nm in 2007, 250nm in 2008 and by 2009 it 
increased to 600nm. For  ships routeing North South, they were to consider keeping East 
of 60 E Longitude East of Seychelles (Mejia, 2010 p 298). 
The turning point in Somali piracy occurred in 2005 when the highest incidents were 
recorded at 35. The attack on MV Seabourne Spirit involving a passenger ship caught 
international attention on piracy primarily due to the number of potential hostages had 
the pirates succeeded and also due to the fact that the ship used the Long Range 
Acoustic Device (LRAD) to repel the pirates. This was the first incidence using active 
devices to repel the pirates The incident caused IMO to organize a meeting in Sana’a, 
Yemen in April 2005 as a first attempt to go regional on the issue. This was followed by 
a similar conference in Oman in January 2006. 
The year 2006 witnessed a significant decline of attacks off the Coast of Somalia and on 
ships delivering WFP aid to Mogadishu owing to the control exercised by Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU) who controlled Mogadishu and southern parts of Somalia. The Transitional 
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Federal Government (TFG) backed by the Ethiopian forces drove the ICU out of 
Mogadishu and established some form of control and chose a new town Baidoa, as the 
seat of the government. This TFG control waned with the withdrawal of Ethiopian 
troops resulting in an escalation of attacks in 2007 and subsequent years (Murphy, 2010 
p 84).  
2.1.6 The Somali piracy statistics 
Piracy statistics have been compiled first by the IMB PIC with others following suit 
among them, the IMO and ReCAAP.  With recent deployment of naval forces reports 
are also compiled by European Union (MSC-HOA), and NATO (NSC). These reports 
have been acknowledged in the past that they are not compressive as most of them are 
compiled based on the reported cases by ship masters particularly in the beginning of the 
reporting period (Mejia, 2010). The statistics for the last two years are however more 
comprehensive owing to the use of LRIT and the presence of the military in the region. 
This research uses statistics from two sources in order to depict specific information of 
choice. 
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Table 1: Number of reported pirate attacks in three regions (2000-2010) 
 
Figure 1 
Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau. (2011) IMB- Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 
Annual Report 1
st
 January – 31st December 2010. Accessed from www.icc-ccs.org 
The figure shows trends in piracy attacks of reported cases from selected areas of South 
East Asia, Somali region including Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. 
The piracy incident attacks are based on original data collected by IMB-PIC for the 
period 2000 to 2010. As can be seen in figure 1 the piracy incidents in South East Asia 
were the highest from 2000 up to 2007 when Somali pirate attacks shot up to record the 
highest attacks and remained so till the end of the reporting period of 2010. Piracy 
incidents in the Gulf of Guinea show a gradual fluctuating trend of between 25 and 35 
incidents per year. 
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In South East Asia there was a decline of piracy incidents attributed to the adoption of 
ReCAAP information sharing mechanisms and regional joint operations such as “eye in 
the sky” by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. 
Table 2: Number of pirate attacks in Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden (2005-2010). 
 
Figure 2 
Source: ICC International Maritime Bureau. (2011) IMB- Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 
Annual Report 1
st
 January – 31st December 2010. Accessed from www.icc-ccs.org 
The figure shows trends in piracy attacks perpetuated by Somali pirates in the Gulf of 
Aden and Somali basin.  There was a steep increase of piracy attacks in the Gulf of 
Aden in 2007 and 2008 with the trend changing to a gradual fall in 2009. The attacks in 
the Somali Basin plummeted in 2008 and rose gradually to overtake the Gulf of Aden in 
mid-2009. This trend can be attributed to the deployment of naval vessels to protect 
merchant ships which saw an International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) 
established in the Gulf of Aden. This led to the pirates adopting use of mother ships to 
attack ships in mainly Somali Basin. 
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Table 3: Monthly number of disrupted and pirated attacks (Jan 2009 – December 
2010) 
 
Figure 3:  
Source: European Union Council Secretariat (2011). EEU NAFOR ATALANTA, www.eunafor.eu 
The figure shows trend in monthly statistics for the, pirated, disrupted and attacked. The 
trend illustrate seasonal fluctuations in the number of attacks with highs recorded in 
October to April and lows recorded in May to September a factor attributed to the 
seasonal weather pattern of the monsoon period in the Indian Ocean region. 
Though the general trend is seasonal, the number of successful attacks shown by the 
difference between the total attacks and successful pirated ships is widening depicting a 
higher rate of disruptions from 2010 owing to increased patrolling by the combined 
maritime force and use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCSG) by 
ships. 
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2.1.7 Somali Pirates modus operandi 
Military strategists have in the past considered an analysis of an enemy essential in 
drafting their military mission orders. Such a clause will consist of facts, such as enemy 
composition, disposition, strength, activity locations, units, observed equipment, enemy 
capabilities, limitation and enemy’s course of action among others. This approach will 
guide this paragraph in its quest to understanding the Somali pirates. 
Various suppositions have been advanced as to the origin and evolvement of Somali 
piracy with two common hypotheses, namely the pirates evolved from rag tag fishermen 
to a well organized crime network with financiers and ground security. The second 
hypothesis has it that it evolved from a holy alliance of three groups, which are the fisher 
folks who know the sea, the militia men who knows the weapons and use of violence 
and the financiers who sponsor the operations. Some common names and organizations 
associated with Somali pirate groups are the Somali Marines led by Abdi Mohamed 
Afywene referred to as the most organized, the Puntland group. the Marka group led by 
Yusuf Indha’adde made up of several decentralized groups and the National Volunteer 
Coast Guard headed by Garaad Mohamed operating around Kismayu in the southern 
region. What many authors and military intelligence organizations agree is the fact that 
most of these groups are clan based (Eichstaedt, 2010, p 56; Mejia, 2010, p 294; Geiss & 
Petrig 2010, p 10). 
The Somali piracy tactics have evolved to match the operational readiness of both the 
ships and the naval protection force. In 2006 and 2007 the pirates would pounce on 
unsuspecting ships and vulnerable ships plying the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden. 
In 2008, 2009 and 2010 with the use of captured fishing vessels as mother ships they 
would attack even faster ships hundreds of miles away from the coast. The weapons 
captured and those witnessed by the crew who had been attacked in the past point to an 
assortment of arms ranging from Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) to small arms AK 
47. 
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Table 4 Position of pirated ships in January 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Source: NATO (2011), Piracy in the Horn of Africa, IMO Somali piracy updates 
2.1.8 Somali piracy business model 
Details obtained by the UN monitoring group on Somalia claim that ransom payments 
are usually managed by a committee comprising of a chair, two principal investors and 
two commanders, that is sea pirates and the guard force and are assisted by an 
accountant who is rewarded with a share equal to that of a guard. 
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The main expenses covered by a ransom payment are the direct operational costs and 
profits. The profits are normally arrived after deductions from the operational expenses. 
Sources indicate that the profits are divided between the investors who take 30% guard 
force 30% and the sea pirates who take 40%. The pirate’s operational costs includes 
committee members, provisions for pirates and captured crews, logistics, cooks, 
negotiators and payoff to other local militia groups. A social obligation to share wealth 
Shahaad is also factored as a cost (Eichtaedt, 2010, p 57). 
2.1.9 Ransom Payment 
Ransom payment has been sighted as a main contributor to the growth of piracy, as part 
of this money is reinvested to acquire better equipment for the pirates and better 
weapons with increased logistics support enabling the pirates to venture far and recruit 
more pirates (UNSC Resolution 1897 (2009)). The payment takes different methods 
with aircrafts dropping the ransom money on hijacked ships to payment through 
transfers such as Hawala system and investments in “khat” drugs. Money paid in 
ransom in 2008 is estimated by United Nations to be over $150 million with single 
ransom payment of MT Sirius Star believed to have been $3 million against the $25m 
demanded and MV Faina $3.2million against an initial demand of $35 million (Payne, 
2010; Nigel 2010).This has led to expansion of the Contact Group on Piracy off the 
coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to include a fifth working group of the CGPCS chaired by 
Italy to look for ways of tracing the ransom payment. 
2.2 Cause and effect 
Piracy has affected nearly all maritime users with the shipping industry bearing the brunt 
of the scourge. In the report The Economic Costs of Piracy published by One Earth 
Future (OEF) Foundation the international economic cost is estimated to be between $7 
to $12 billion per year (Bowden, 2010, p 2,; IMO, 2011). 
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These costs are inform of direct financial costs of piracy which includes insurance costs, 
ransoms, cost of rerouting ships via the cape, security arrangements including private 
security detachments, cost of maintaining navies among other related government 
expenses. Other indirect costs occur as negative effects on other related areas like trade, 
fishing, inflation and tourism resulting to decrease in foreign revenue. 
Psychological effects such as trauma to the seafarers and their families for those held 
and also for those working in the piracy affected areas are common. By June 2011 there 
were 462 seafarers and 22 ships held by Somali pirates for ransom (IMO, 2011). The 
setting on fire of MV Yasin C in 2010 and MV Pacific Express in 2011 after the crew 
escaped to citadel is an indication of what seafarers can be exposed to by frustrated 
pirates. In the fragile Somalia, the pirates net more money than government causing 
more political instability. It is a case of money equating power and the pirates are 
exploiting their new found influence and affluence (Payne, 2010, p 34). 
2.3 International and regional response to Somali piracy 
The IMO Assembly adopted Resolution A. 979 (24) (IMO, 2005) on piracy and armed 
robbery against ships in waters off the Coast of Somalia in consultation with the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This marked the beginning of high level 
engagement of the IMO on Somali piracy. The IMO sought the attention of the president 
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), who issued a presidential statement on 
the matter in 2006. 
IMO revised Resolution A.979(24)(IMO,2005) and in place adopted Resolution 
A.1002(25)(2007) which urged parties with naval capability to deploy naval ships and 
further addressed the Flag states on the advice to give to ship crews sailing these areas. 
In paragraph 7 the Resolution “called upon Governments in the region to conclude, in 
co-operation with the Organization and implement as soon as possible, a regional 
agreement to prevent, deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships”. The 
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IMO held its first regional meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania where a draft text of 
agreement was drafted in April 2008 setting the scene for the adoption of the Code. 
On the International scene, the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008) which 
authorized States cooperating with the TFG to enter the territorial sea off the coast of 
Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea is cited as 
the turning point in the anti-piracy campaign. The wording of the Resolution contained 
some fundamental principles of International law on sovereignty and was limited for a 
six month period. 
With international backing the IMO mobilized the regional countries of Comoros, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, 
Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, the 
United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen to adopt the 
Djibouti Code on 29 January 2009. Nine governments signed the Code on the date of 
adoption making the Code effective since it only required signatures by two participants. 
IMO established a multi donor trust fund and a counter piracy Project Implementing 
Unit (PIU) in 2010 to assist signatory states to implement the Code. The team is 
composed of a team head, and three project officers. At the time of writing the Fund had 
received donations from Japan, South Korea, France, Norway, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and Panama.  
2.4 Conclusion 
Piracy criminal acts as seen in the chapter are bound to adopt new tactics and means 
with chances that they may resurface in different geographical localities provided that 
the underlying factors exist in that particular geographical area, such as weak states 
unable to establish rule of law, weak surveillance and law enforcement at sea.  
Military means used in the past for suppressing piracy is no longer viable owing to the 
modern globalized political environment where human rights and sovereignty issues are 
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considered fundamental. This call for the IMO and the international community to adopt 
other mechanisms aimed at discouraging would be pirates to engage in criminal acts by 
increasing the consequences of engaging in the crimes as contained in the articles of the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair put the situation 
succinctly with the following statement: “Our ultimate weapon against piracy is not our 
guns but our belief.” 
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Chapter 3 
Anti-piracy regional instruments: Djibouti Code of Conduct and ReCAAP 
“The devil is in the details” (Ludwig Van Der Rohe 1886-1969) 
3.1 Introduction 
The importance and implication of a text in a contract of the nature of a treaty is codified 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) where in section 3 Article 31 to 
33 is dedicated to treaty interpretation. Although the Djibouti Code is not a treaty yet, it 
should be borne that Article 13 of the Djibouti Code provides that the participants intent 
to consult with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement.  
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on obligation not to defeat the object and purpose 
of a treaty prior to its entry into force is a guiding principle when dealing with the Code. 
This chapter will seek to scrutinize the text of the Djibouti Code with a view to 
establishing the motive of the framers of various articles and the expectation from the 
participants in implementing the Code by drawing parallels with the existing ReCAAP, 
the first such regional cooperation mechanism in modern time and expressly stated as 
the inspiration of the Code in the preamble. 
3.2 Preamble 
The significance of preamble in a treaty is entrenched in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (1969) text on interpretation of treaty where it is stated that “a treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objective and purpose”. Article 32 
further provides for supplementary means of interpretation, including “the preparatory 
work” of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. 
The Djibouti Code was signed in January 2009, following the astronomical increase in 
Somali piracy cases in 2008, and against a background where these incidents had 
attracted a worldwide attention. Notable hijackings included MV Faina with a cargo of 
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33 T-72 Soviet designed tanks among other assorted military ware and MT Sirius Star, a 
newly built ship worth $150 million, carrying crude oil worth $100 million. These two 
incidents had attracted worldwide publicity and concern sending all interested parties in 
a desperate search for a solution to these attacks. This explains the wide acceptance 
given to the initiative. Nine regional countries signed the Code on adoption. 
The signing took place following the UNSC issue of Resolutions 1816 in June, 2008, 
Resolution 1838 in 2008, 184 in 2008 and 1851 in October, 2008 issued under chapter 
VII of the UN Charter which applied only to the case in Somalia. The Code notes all 
these four resolutions in the preamble pointing to the influence of the UNSC in the 
preparatory work of the Code. The UN Resolution 63/111 of December 2008 on Ocean 
and the Law of the Sea is also noted in the preamble. This resolution contains a text 
which recognizes the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional, 
sub-regional and bilateral levels in combating threats to maritime security.  
The motive of IMO prior to the signing of the Code is evident in its Resolutions A.922 
(22) adopted in November 2001 on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes 
of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. This resolution invited governments to 
develop agreements and procedures to facilitate co-operation in applying efficient and 
effective measures to prevent acts of piracy. Resolution A.1002 (25) adopted in 
November 2007 specifically for Somali waters called governments in the region to 
conclude, in co-operation with IMO, and implement a regional agreement to prevent, 
deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships; pointing to the role that IMO 
would play in such a regional agreement. 
Players recognized in the preamble are international agencies, such as the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), European Commission and League of Arab States who are touted as 
potential partners in provision of technical assistance and other forms of capacity 
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building. This is an indication of the partnership concept which guides the cooperative 
mechanism of the Code. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(CGPCS) established a fortnight before the signing is mentioned possibly due to the 
expected international role it would play in mobilizing and coordinating contributions of 
international efforts. 
The last paragraph of the preamble notes the need for a comprehensive approach to 
address the poverty and instability that create conditions conducive to piracy which may 
include strategies for effective environmental conservation and fisheries management. 
The need to address the possible environmental consequences of piracy is also included, 
which could be interpreted as recognizing the interests of Somalia and at the same 
acknowledging the need for alternative livelihood strategies to be included in the long 
term. 
In ReCAAP the preamble is brief and recognizes UNCLOS concept for ships and crew 
to exercise the right of navigation and the State duty to cooperate in the prevention and 
suppression of piracy. This can be construed to be the guiding principle of the 
Agreement. There exist a clause affirming that each participant should strengthen its 
measures aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships 
indicating a State centered approach before moving towards a regional and international 
cooperation. This approach may not be applicable in Djibouti Code considering that 
Somalia, which is a major player in the Code, is a failed state. 
ReCAAP acknowledged origin is in the Tokyo Appeal of March 2000, the Asia Anti-
Piracy Challenge 2000 and Tokyo Model Action Plan of April 2000 (Menefee, 2008, p 
187). The ASEAN +3 summit meeting proposed a conference on combating piracy and 
armed robbery against ships. This meeting was held on October, 2001 and discussed 
medium and long term visions of a regional cooperation framework. The text of the 
ReCAAP was drafted by representatives from the ASEAN+6 that is the ten members of 
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ASEAN plus six other countries, which are Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka and East 
Asia China, Japan and South Korea. The key pillars of the agreement which are 
information sharing and capacity building are expressed in the preamble indicating the 
concept the framers intended to pursue right from the onset unlike Djibouti where this is 
contained in the principle articles (Mejia, 2010, p 128). 
Both the Agreement and the Code have adopted the piracy definition provided in 
UNCLOS 101 and further defines armed robbery against ships as defined in the Annex 
to the Resolution A.922(22) adopted in January 22, 2009. ReCAAP in its introductory 
part dwells on General Provisions under Article 2 and General Obligations in Article 3. 
These articles address generic issues of contracting parties, such as sovereignty rights. 
The Djibouti Code is very specific regarding geographical location where the code 
applies. The opening clause under purpose and scope states “consistent with the 
available resources and related priorities” a clause which can be interpreted as a 
reflection of the non-binding nature of the Code leaving it to participating States to 
determine what areas of the Code to execute, including prioritization.  
3.4 Principal features 
3.4.1 Embarked officers 
The Djibouti Code introduces a concept of embarked officers in article 7 where a 
participant may nominate law enforcement or other authorized officials to a patrol ship 
of another participant. In the preceding paragraphs the drafters attempt to guide the 
conduct of the embarked officers by laying down some basic legal and policy 
considerations. 
This could be in anticipation of bilateral agreements to be entered and hence lays the 
background of what could possibly be included in the text agreement. A more elaborate 
analysis of this article is discussed in the next chapter. This concept is not contained in 
the ReCAAP model probably due to complex issues of these kinds of agreements such 
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as reciprocity, suspicion and State interests which have the potential of slowing down 
any international cooperation (Baylis &Smith, 2004, p 426). 
3.4.2 Information Sharing Centre 
The Code designates three information sharing centers to be situated in the maritime 
rescue coordination center in Mombasa Kenya and Dar es Salaam in the United 
Republic of Tanzania and the regional information center in Sana’a Yemen. 
ReCAAP has created an information sharing center with its location in Singapore and 
structures for the Centre comprising a Governing Council and a Secretariat complete 
with functions for each. Article 6 of ReCAAP also provides for a financing mechanism 
of the center and states the sources of funding as, host state, voluntary contributions 
from Contracting Parties, voluntary contributions from international organizations and 
other entities, in accordance with relevant criteria adopted by the governing council and 
any other voluntary contributions as may be agreed upon by governing council. 
The Djibouti Code lacks such elaborate text on functions of such centers and does not 
specify the relations among the three and leaves the individual participants to ensure the 
smooth running of these centers. This could be deliberated and agreed once the Code 
becomes binding. 
3.4.3 National Focal Points 
The national focal points are deemed in the Code as part of the information sharing 
mechanism where participants are expected to designate a focal point capable of 
receiving and responding to alerts and requests for information or assistance at all times. 
This article could be interpreted as laying down the basic requirements in terms of 
minimum communication infrastructure and the authority of the point of contact to 
coordinate and offer assistance through competent national authorities. 
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The ReCAAP requires the contracting parties to designate a focal point responsible for 
its communication with the Centre and which should be declared at the time of the 
signature or deposit of an instrument of notification. The agreement requires the 
contracting parties to ensure smooth and effective communication between its 
designated focal point and other competent national authorities including rescue 
coordinating centers. 
The Code further states the intention of the participants to keep each other fully 
informed concerning their respective applicable laws and guidance, particularly those 
pertaining to the interdiction, apprehension, investigation, prosecution and disposition of 
persons involved in piracy and armed robbery. 
The inclusion of this clause shows that the emphasis of Djibouti Code is leaning more to 
prosecution as a means of addressing piracy while at the same time it could be 
acknowledging the inability of the Somali government institutions to enforce law and 
order and carry out judicial functions. 
3.4.4 Assistance among participants 
The Code stipulates areas where a participant may request another participant that is 
persons who have committed, reasonably suspected of committing both piracy and or 
armed robbery or pirate ships, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect the ships. 
Information on ships or persons subjected to piracy or armed robberies is also included. 
Joint exercises and capacity building, which may include technical assistance, such as 
educational training programs to share experience and best practices, are also included 
as part of assistance among participants. 
ReCAAP dwells heavily on cooperation, dedicating two articles in part 3 and the entire 
part 4 of the agreement. Areas for request of cooperation include requests to cooperate in 
detecting pirates, pirate ship or any person who have committed armed robbery against 
ships. Request for cooperation also include arrest or seizure. It further states the request 
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may be to take effective measures to rescue a victim ship, and victims of piracy or armed 
robbery against ships. In article 11 the agreement compels a contracting party to make 
every effort to take effective and practical measures to implement such requests. 
3.4.5 Review of National Legislation 
The Code has an article on review of national legislation (article11) which is aimed at 
having adequate laws within the region to tackle piracy and armed robbery. The 
ReCAAP did not consider this kind of approach probably due to the fact that most of the 
incidents were happening in territorial waters of the littoral states, whose laws were 
probably deemed adequate in addressing these acts. The Djibouti Code envisions 
fulfillment of this article through review of participant’s national legislation to allow for 
prosecution, conviction, punishment and facilitate extradition or handing over when 
prosecution is not possible. 
ReCAAP article 13 obligates contracting parties subject to their national laws and 
regulations to endeavor to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters including 
the submission of evidence related to piracy and armed robbery against ships at the 
request of another contracting party.  
3.4.6 Extradition 
The ReCAAP has an article on extradition whereby the parties are obliged, subject to 
their national laws and regulations, to endeavor to extradite pirates or persons who have 
committed armed robbery against ships and who are present in its territory to the other 
contracting party which has jurisdiction over them at the request of that contracting 
party. 
The Code has included this important aspect in its article on review of national 
legislations whose process should facilitate extradition or handing over when 
prosecution is not possible. 
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3.4.7 Dispute settlement and claims 
The Code has two separate articles on dispute settlement and claims and states that if 
responsibility is established the claim should be resolved in accordance with the national 
law of that participant and adds in a manner consistent with international law including 
article 106 and Paragraph 3 of article 110 of UNCLOS. The ReCAAP combines 
settlement of disputes and claims in one article, where it states that such shall be settled 
amicably by the contracting parties concerned through negotiation with applicable rules 
of international law.  
3.4.8 Consultations 
The Code has one salient clause in article 13 on consultation, which states that within 2 
years of the effective date (1
st
 Feb 2009) the participant intends to consult with the 
assistance of IMO with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement. This is further 
amplified under miscellaneous provisions, which state that nothing in the Code is 
intended to create or establish a binding agreement except as noted in the article. In 
ReCAAP the government of Singapore is the depository of the agreement, while in the 
Code the depository is the IMO headquarters clearly defining the leaders in the two 
instruments. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The text of the Djibouti Code is found to be sufficient in rallying the regional countries 
together to address the piracy incidents in the region albeit for the short and middle term. 
An in depth analysis of the three main articles will be discussed in the preceding 
chapters in order to arrive at a fair assessment and expectation of the impacts of the 
articles in suppressing piracy acts. 
The experience from ReCAAP, however, points to regional political commitment by the 
signatory states, role of regional leadership by Singapore and a hegemonic stability role 
provided by Japan as key to this successful cooperative mechanism. 
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Chapter 4 
Embarkation of Law enforcement officers 
“The new shiprider protocol is clearly a force multiplier, it will significantly 
assist in the fight against narcotics traffickers in the region, together 
Jamaica and United States along with our partners will have greater 
coverage, greater reach, greater ability to detect and seize narcotics 
shipments” ( Sue Cobb, US Ambassador to Jamaica 2004) 
4.1 Introduction 
The deployment of international navies in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin in early 
2008 was met with unexpected challenges in apprehension of pirates leading to some 
navies adopting the catch and release tactics due to lack of clear course on what to do 
with the captured pirates. Issues related to human rights, ships mandate, missions and 
rules of engagement further complicated matters for the naval forces. 
This challenge was expressed in the UNSC meeting by the UNODC executive director 
Antonio Costa, who proposed the use of the “shiprider” concept to circumvent the legal 
impediments being faced. The concept was incorporated in the UNSC Resolution 1851 
of 2008, which invited all states and regional organizations fighting piracy in the region 
to enter into “ship rider” agreements. This chapter will examine this principal article of 
the Code with a view of identifying the possible implementation avenues and potential 
key players for its realization. 
4.2 Concept background 
The inclusion of this article can be traced to the “Shiprider” concept where two states 
enter into a bilateral agreement to have officials of one State embark on a vessel of 
another State for the purposes of law enforcement. The purpose of such agreements are 
to overcome jurisdictional hurdles and broaden law enforcement powers (Geiss & Petrig 
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2010) This approach has been practiced by the United States of America with Canada 
and the Caribbean countries on anti- narcotics campaigns.  
The UNSC Resolution 1851 of November 2008 contains a paragraph where it invites all 
states and regional organizations fighting piracy off the Coast of Somalia to conclude 
special agreements or arrangements with countries willing to take custody of pirates in 
order to embark law enforcement officials (“shipriders)”. The Resolution went further to 
state that this would facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a 
result of operations conducted preceding the resolution. The resolution contains a clause 
that the above is subject to advance consent of the TFG for the exercise of third state 
jurisdiction by “shiprider” and that it should not prejudice the effective implementation 
of the SUA Convention. This resolution came amid press claims that the navies were 
releasing captured pirates due to lack of prosecution powers. 
The above text was repeated after the signing of the Djibouti Code in November 2009 
through UNSCR 1897, which among other things acknowledged the signing of the 
Djibouti Code in January 2009. At the time of this Resolution, prosecutions problem of 
pirates still persisted and there were no known agreements which had been concluded to 
that effect prompting the repeat of the concept in the resolution. 
The wording of Article 9 paragraph one of the Code that a participant may nominate law 
enforcement or other authorized officials to embark in the patrol ships or aircraft of 
another participant may itself limit the scope of host participants since the Code limits 
number of states eligible Participants to the Code (21). Of the eligible countries only 
France has warships in the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and has to date not signed 
the Code further restricting the use of the concept to only those states willing to 
contribute law enforcement officers. 
In the wording of UNSC Resolutions 1851 and 1897 the envisioned purpose of the 
“shiprider” is more a means for enabling the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction rather 
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than enlarge enforcement powers since TFG had already given consent for States 
involved in counter piracy operations to enter Somali territorial waters through the same 
UNSC resolutions (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, p 87). 
A review of “shiprider” agreements points to the fact that these agreements are bilateral 
and very specific between two countries (the US and Canada, the US and Trinidad and 
Tobago, the US and Jamaica). The purpose of the “shiprider” is to grant authority on 
behalf of the host state. In order to realize this concept the regional countries would need 
to enter into a specific agreement with states operating in the region and would grant 
permission in case the pirates were to be pursued to the countries’ territorial waters. The 
article could be expanded to allow the embarked officers to apply and act under their 
own law to effect seizure and detention of pirate vessels. 
4.3 Prospective host participants 
4.3.1 The United States 
The United States has a presence in the region comprising ships employed under the 
Task forces 150,151 and 153 which could see bilateral arrangements signed between the 
United States of America and the regional countries. The areas of responsibility of this 
Task force include Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, Eritrea and Seychelles. There are indications 
that there exists a possibility of including the neighboring areas of Tanzania, Mauritius, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Yemen and Comoros who are members of the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct. 
The US has an existing memorandum of understanding with Kenya on prosecution of 
pirates captured by their naval forces, and through this memorandum pirates were 
prosecuted and convicted (Omar v Republic 2007).. Similar arrangement exists with the 
Seychelles, where prosecution of pirates handed over by the US is ongoing. 
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4.3.2 European Union Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta 
This force was formed as a result of UN resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1836 and following 
a joint council action 2008/851/CFSP of 10
th
 November, 2008 on EU military operation 
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the coast of Somali. This force comprise of EU members who have 
contributed assets, personnel and finances. The Headquarters is based in Northwood, the 
United Kingdom. 
The force size at any one time consists of 5 to 10 surface combat ships, 1 to 2 auxiliary 
ships and 2 to 4 maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft. It comprises a total of around 
2000 military personnel including land-based personnel. Operation Atalanta’s stated 
mission objectives include the protection of vessels of WFP delivering food aid to 
displaced persons in Somalia, protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali 
coast and deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships off the Somali Coast and contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities 
off the coast of Somalia. The EU has signed an agreement on transfer of pirates with 
Kenya and Seychelles and can have this memorandum reviewed to include “shiprider” 
provision.  
4.3.3 Members of Combined Maritime Force (CMF) 
The CMF force comprises of Task Forces 150, TF 151 and 152 formed with a principle 
aim to deter, disrupt and defeat attempts by international terrorist organizations to use 
the maritime environment as a venue for an attack or as a means to transport personnel 
weapons and other materials. The contributing members include Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, German, Italy, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States The 
Task Force 151 established in January 2009 was specifically to conduct counter piracy 
operations around the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin. The Task Force 152 operates in 
the Arabian Gulf conducting Maritime security operations in conjunction with regional 
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partners to prevent destabilizing activities and promote maritime security. Members of 
this task force include Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, France, New Zealand, Italy, Australia, 
the UK and the US. The inclusion of regional states in this military forum particularly 
those of Gulf States come with potential for realization of this concept. 
4.3.4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization-“operation ocean shield” 
The involvement of NATO in anti-piracy operations has its genesis to the UNSC 
Resolutions 1814.1816 and 1836 when the organization launched Operation Allied 
Provider between October and December 2008. The mission of this operation was to 
escort World Food Program (WFP) vessels and patrol the waters around Somalia. This 
first mission had three combat Ships from Italy, Greece and the UK. 
This mission was followed by Operation Allied Protector from March to August 2009 
which had its mission and objectives modified to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate 
activities in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa in response to increased attacks 
recorded in this period. 
This operation gave rise to the current Operation Ocean Shield which commenced in 
August 2009 after the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the mission. This 
operation introduces a new element to its mission by offering regional states assistance 
upon request to develop a regional maritime capacity in combating piracy such as law 
enforcements, which may include Coast Guards operations. 
This offer could be easily expanded to include embarkation of these law enforcement 
officers as part of the assistance to regional training where the “shipriders” could be 
utilized to carry out law enforcement roles in the course of onboard training. 
4.3.5 Peoples Republic of China 
The People’s Republic of China has contributed naval assets comprising of two 
destroyers and one supply vessel since January 2009 and has been participating in the 
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SHADE monthly meetings. The country has signed a memorandum of understanding 
with Kenya on transfer of captured pirates an indication of commitment of the country in 
regional stability in its quest for new investments and markets. 
Chinas’ involvement in the region can easily see a “shiprider” agreement concluded as it 
currently enjoys a close collaboration with the regional countries through its investments 
policy in the region. 
4.4 Challenges to realization of the concept 
4.4.1 Contravention of UNCLOS 
The rationale behind use of flag is embedded in UNCLOS and its legal certainty in the 
exercise of enforcement of powers at sea. It has been argued that by embarking law 
enforcement officers to operate from a host vessel for the purposes of law enforcement 
subjects the ship to two flags or two legal regimes which could be in contravention of 
the principle of UNCLOS where a ship only sails under one flag. (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, 
p 90) 
UNCLOS Article 107 on ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize pirate ships states 
that it may be carried by warships or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and 
identifiable as being on government service. Whereas this can be easily attained on the 
host vessel it may complicate matters for law enforcement officers in the high seas and 
only restrict the use of these “shipriders” to the territorial waters of the embarked 
officers. 
4.4.2 Human Rights consideration 
The MoU between Kenya and EU, Denmark and the United States has a clause which 
stipulates that the transferred pirates will not be given death sentence or have to be 
commuted to life sentence. This can be seen as a safeguard to the principle of non- 
refoulment.  It is not clear what course such a case would take if it was done primarily 
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using the domestic law in those jurisdictions where death penalty exist in Yemen, Kenya 
and Tanzania. 
It is not clear how this legal principle can be circumvented in the event that the captured 
pirates will be tried under the Kenyan Law, which provides for death penalty without 
explicit provisions like the ones contained in the memorandum of understanding. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The “ship rider” concept has the potential for increasing law enforcement capacity by 
utilizing the regional countries’ law enforcement officers and the deployed assets in the 
region. The “shipriders” policing skills and forensic work background could provide 
initial and on spot investigation of piracy cases crucial for gathering and collection of 
evidence for later criminal proceedings.  
There are for the time being sufficient resources in terms of naval vessels (32) deployed 
in the region and available regional law enforcement officers who could be deployed as 
“shipriders”. The Djibouti Code training center could be used to train regional law 
enforcement officers who could provide a pool to be embarked onboard willing naval 
ships for the purposes of attainment of this objective under the Code. 
This research has, however established that such agreements are concluded between two 
states and hence the IMO could consider devising ways of initiating these bilateral 
arrangements. The existing MoU between western countries and some regional 
countries, such as Kenya and the Seychelles on prosecution of pirates could be explored 
for possible inclusion of "shiprider" clauses. 
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Chapter 5 
Incident reporting and Information sharing mechanism 
 “We will conduct operations with compatible information and 
communication systems, usable data and flexible operational constructs 
beyond battlefield application,” (Robert Gates Defense secretary on US 
defense strategy 2006). 
5.1 Introduction 
The push for a common system of communication in the maritime industry first came 
into the scene with the first treaty of SOLAS in 1914 following the sinking of RMS 
Titanic in 1912, which introduced requirement for carriage of Radio and continuous 
Radio watches. Versions of SOLAS have been adopted since then with the latest 2010 
edition still containing an entire chapter IV on Radio Communications specifying Radio 
requirements for both shore facilities and ships in regulations 5 and 6.  
The information technology sector has, however, recorded one of the fastest growths 
with breakthroughs in digital and satellite technologies ushering in a wide range of 
equipment and systems. This can present a challenge to a consumer in deciding on a 
particular system in such a large market and hence the need for the user to determine a 
minimum system requirement to guide his choice. The IMO has relied on performance 
standards and result based standards when it comes to decisions related to similar 
systems. 
This chapter will review the existing communications and information system with a 
view of identifying those systems which can be adopted in the implementation and 
realization of this article of the Code. 
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5.2 Maritime Safety: Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS)  
The GMDSS system adopted as an amendment to SOLAS chapter IV introduced a new 
era in the maritime industry as far as information exchange is concerned. The adoption 
of this amendment came in the wake of another convention the International Convention 
on Maritime Search and Rescue (1979) which introduced the Global Search And Rescue 
(SAR) Plan which seeks to achieve a worldwide SAR coverage by responsible nations. 
The designation of the maritime rescue coordination centers as the piracy information 
center in the Code hints that the GMDSS concept forms the basic equipment 
requirement in the arrangement. The specifications for this system are contained in 
SOLAS Chapter IV regulations 5 and 6. The system enables a ship to send distress in 
any part of the globe. It would mean that the national focal point will consider the 
GMDSS as the primary communication information sharing system. 
The main advantage for this system is the fact that it is subject to IMO regulations with 
already developed performance standards and the hardware are readily available in the 
market. 
5.2.1 Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) 
The SSAS has its roots in the infamous September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the US by 
use of civilian aircrafts on both the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. IMO woke up to 
the realization that ships could also be used to carry out similar attacks on civilian 
targets. This led to adoption of Resolution A .924(22)(2001) which amended SOLAS 
Chapter XI-2 and ushered a new role of IMO in maritime security. These amendments 
brought in a new carriage requirement under regulation 6 which ships and mobile 
offshore drilling platforms have complied since 1
st
 July 2006. The system has been 
widely used in disseminating information on piracy attacks. 
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The concept of the system is that a ship should be able to send a security alert when 
under attack to the Administration, the company, maritime rescue coordination center or 
any other security center as specified by the administration of the ship. 
This system can be linked to the Djibouti Code PIC that could also monitor the alarm. 
The information can be further relayed to a particular center focal point which could 
include the country’s law enforcements and naval detachments capable of responding. 
5.2.2 Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) 
This IMO information sharing system has its origins in circular. ES 18/16 (1995) which 
sought to have an international ship information data base (ISP) with a purpose then to 
compile and make information available on worldwide basis on maritime safety 
pollution prevention and on conditions of ships. 
The system has been expanded to support other reporting modules including piracy 
information among other modules such as maritime security, recognized organization, 
port reception facilities, contact points, marine casualties and incidents, pollution 
prevention equipment, training simulators and greenhouse gas emissions. 
5.3 Piracy Information exchange 
5.3.1 IMB Piracy Information Center 
The IMB-PIC is a nonprofit organization which established a piracy reporting center in 
October 1992 in Kuala Lampur in Malaysia. This center has been involved in compiling 
all reports on piracy and disseminating the same information to ships ever since. 
The center sends broadcast to ships via Inmarsat C safety net containing daily status 
reports on piracy incidents and also posts information and update on attacks in its 
website www.ics-ccs.org. 
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The IMB-ICC has a wider coverage as all GMDSS compliant ships receive this 
broadcast. It may not be cost effective to duplicate this system of broadcast and what 
could be looked at is linking the regions’ piracy information centers to IMB-PIC as a 
priority source of information and maintain a single source of broadcast for the time 
being. 
5.3.2 ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC) 
The ISC-Focal point concept uses a web based secure network linking the national focal 
points with the information sharing center based in Singapore. The national focal points 
are connected to other Focal points via other means of communication as agreed in 
different countries mostly Telephone and VHF Radio and MF Radio also part of the 
GMDSS set of equipment. 
 Member Countries are able to log in and update information on reported incidents 
which is made available to all other focal points. This system could be linked to the three 
information centers for a wider global picture of pirate attacks as these centers are 
permanently manned unlike the naval centers which are deployed for a specified time 
and are subject to extension on case by case and priority consideration. 
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Table 5: Flow diagram for reporting Incidents in ReCAAP 
 
Figure 5 
Source: ReCAAP-(2010), Measures for combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, 
APEC/OPRF Workshop 
5.3.3 The Maritime Security Center –Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) 
This center was established by the European Naval Force with close cooperation with 
the industry in 2009 to provide a 24hr manned monitoring of ships transiting through the 
Gulf of Aden. This initiative runs an interactive website which gives updated piracy 
information and enables vessels to register movement.  
This website allows a password access where merchant ships transiting the Gulf and 
Somali Basin are able to log in electronically and also receive the latest warning and 
information concerning piracy attack. 
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5.3.4 NATO Shipping Center (NSC) 
The NSC established by NATO forces acts as a link between the NATO forces deployed 
in the region and the merchant shipping community. The center has launched a new 
piracy information website which gives alerts and enables ships to log and gain 
information regarding potential piracy risks and actions ( “NATO Launches…piracy 
information website” 2011, Sep/Oct The Sea,(213), pp2) 
5.3.5 The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) 
This office based in Dubai United Arab Emirates (UAE) has its origin in the aftermath 
of the US bombing by civilian aircraft on September 11, 2001. The office was launched 
to act as a point of contact by the maritime industry on security issues in the Gulf region. 
However the focus has shifted to anti-piracy and maritime security operations where the 
center acts as the primary point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military 
forces operating in the region. 
The center also administers the voluntary reporting scheme where merchant vessels are 
encouraged to send regular reports regarding the ship position, course and speed which 
is shared with the naval forces. The center is listed in the Best Management Practices 
(BMP) a handbook developed by the Industry as the primary point of contact for ships 
coming under the piracy attacks. 
5.4 Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
5.4.1 Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
The AIS is designed to provide information about a ship to other ships and coastal 
authorities automatically. The system was adopted through an amendment to SOLAS 
chapter V which brought in mandatory carriage requirement by ships of 300GT and 
above with effect from 31
st
 December 2004. 
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Information provided automatically by a ship fitted with AIS includes ships identity, 
type, position, speed, navigational situation and other safety related information. A ship 
fitted with an AIS receiver also receives similar information. 
5.4.2 Long Range Information and Tracking System (LRIT) 
The LRIT System was brought to the shipping industry through an amendment to 
Chapter V regulation 19-1 by a MSC Resolution MSC.202 (81) (2005) establishing a 
carrying requirement for specified ships including mobile offshore drilling unit since 1
st
 
January 2009. 
The system consists of ship borne LRIT information transmission equipment, 
communications service provider, application service provider and data LRIT data 
center. The information transmitted includes the ship’s identity position and the time of 
transmission. 
The above Regulation further allowed access of LRIT information by interested parties, 
such as the to the flag state on ships entitled to fly its flag to determine their location 
anytime, Port State on ships which have indicated to enter its port facilities, Coastal state 
on ships navigating within 1000 and not intending to entre its port facilities and Search 
and rescue services relating to ships and persons in distress.  
The anti-piracy potential for this system was realized through the adoption of an MSC 
Resolution MSC 298 (87)(IMO 2010) which established a distribution facility for the 
provision of LRIT information to security forces operating in the Gulf of Aden and the 
Western Indian Ocean to aide their operations on repression of piracy. This can also be 
pursued for the Code to have a similar data distribution facility for the organization. 
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Table 6: Illustration of LRIT System Architecture 
 
 
Figure 6  
Source: International Maritime Organization, (2009), Introduction to the Long Range and tracking, 
www.lrit.com 
5.4.3 The Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSI) 
The MSSI was developed by the Volpe National Transportation System center at the US 
Department of Transportation Research and Innovative Technology Administration and 
is a freely shared unclassified near real time data collection and distribution network. 
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This system is available to nations willing to participate and several regional countries, 
such as Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles are already participating. The 
system provides participating States access to global shipping information using a 
password protected Internet based link.  
5.4.4 The Ship Security Reporting System (SSRS) 
The SSRS is a counter piracy service that enhances the ship security alert system by 
linking the ship sending the alert to the information sharing centers in the region such as 
the MSC-HOA, UKMTO and OPS ATALANTA. 
The service continuously monitors alerts transmitted by SSAS on board vessels and is 
able to compare the position of the vessel sending the alert and the position recorded by 
the MSC-HOA and UKMTO. On confirmation of the alert and attack the information is 
passed on to all the operating forces with a copy going to the Company Security Officer 
(CSO) who also get to know which forces have been alerted and hence could get in 
touch with them for any update.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The wide range of technologies and information system discussed above are found 
suitable for the task envisioned in the Code. However there need to be established 
minimum system requirements which could be guided by some basic principles of a 
system such as compatibility, reliability, adaptability and affordability. 
Those systems which have already been approved by the IMO and have minimum 
performance standards agreed could be prioritized when it comes to choice of a system. 
It should also be borne in mind that due to the fast technological changes in the sector 
considerations should also be made for utilization of emerging technologies. This may 
require further consideration by the IMO sub-committee on Communications and Search 
Rescue (COMSAR) the subcommittee of MSC which works with ITU on issues of 
frequency allocation for similar maritime communication systems. 
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Chapter 6 
Review of National legislation for the regional countries 
“There never has been any doubt that every nation may lawfully conduct a 
war against pirates, even if they have not been attacked by them”(Francis 
Bacon, English Statesman 1561-1616) 
6.1 Introduction 
Internationally there exists a sufficient legal regime capable of addressing piracy cases 
with many legal scholars citing the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS 1982) and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988) as the most important ones having been 
assented by most of the UN member states. However, it is the municipal law of a given 
country which determines whether prosecution of pirates succeeds or is defeated in 
accordance with the provisions and procedures of the particular jurisdiction. 
This chapter will examine the provisions of piracy in Kenyan Law having prosecuted the 
highest number of suspected pirates. The legal regime of Tanzania is also examined 
owing to its inability to carry out prosecutions. The chapter will seek to identify legal 
challenges to be addressed in the process of reviewing the legislation in fulfillment of 
this Article of the Code. 
6.2 Background 
The jurisdictional dilemma in prosecution of piracy can be traced to the treatise of 
Cicero, a Roman author of 44 BC where he notes on pirates “The common enemy of all 
(Communis hostis omnium), cannot be considered a criminal, because he does not 
belong to the city- state, yet he cannot be counted among the foreign opponents of war” 
(Daniel, 2009, p16). A similar dilemma faces the current navies deployed in the region 
on what to do with the pirates once captured. 
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The framers of the Djibouti Code sought to solve this judicial puzzle by insertion of 
Article 11 where the participants would review their national legislation with an 
intention of ensuring that there are national laws in place to criminalize piracy and 
armed robbery against ships. This article is viewed by many as one of the most 
progressive provision of the Code (Wambua, 2010, p10). The wording of this article 
leads one to sum the end state as achievement of prosecution, conviction, punishment, 
and extradition which guides the content of this chapter. 
6.2 Prosecution 
Prosecution can be understood as the legal process of bringing an alleged offender to 
trial. It is therefore prudent to establish what constitutes these legal processes to allow an 
in depth evaluation of a given nation’s legal framework before an attempt can be made 
on identification of areas requiring review. One important aspect is to look at the 
Jurisdictional basis and the related legal framework which creates the jurisdiction to try 
cases. This legal framework consists of existing legal regime comprising of customary 
international law, UNCLOS, the ISPS Code, SUA, Regional and Bilateral treaties and 
National Law (Mbiah, 2010, p 303). 
6.2.1 Republic of Kenya-The Penal Code 
The Republic of Kenya has a common law legal system whose piracy prosecutorial 
powers had been derived from the Penal Code (Chapter 63 Laws of Kenya), section 69 
prior to enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act (2009), which repealed the section. 
This section provided that “any person who, in territorial waters or upon high seas, 
commits any act of piracy jure gentium is guilty of offense of piracy”. It further states 
that “Any person who is guilty of the offence of piracy is liable to imprisonment for 
life”. 
Kenya prosecuted the first ten suspected pirates under the charge of piracy contrary to 
section 69(1) as read with Section 69 (3) of the Penal Code .( Chapter 63 Laws of 
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Kenya). The case was tried in the Magistrates Court at Mombasa (Republic v Hassan M. 
A 2006) and the accused were sentenced to seven (7) years with Right to Appeal in 14 
days. 
The case was appealed (Hassan M. A v Republic 2008) where the appellant raised issues 
among them that the principal magistrate erred in law in her finding that she had 
jurisdiction to try the case and also in finding out that she could try the offence under the 
Penal Code even when the offence was committed outside the territorial sea of Kenya. 
The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the offence of piracy can be adjudicated 
and is punishable in the country and no limitations existed in the section. The judge F. 
Azangala held that the court with jurisdiction is that of a 1
st
 class magistrate of all ranks 
save the rank of resident magistrate and hence the principle magistrate clearly had 
jurisdiction under the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. 
In delivering the ruling, the judge allowed the definition of piracy to apply as defined in 
UNCLOS Article 101 and held that the Country is a member of the civilized world and 
hence was bound to apply international norms and instruments. He further held that the 
country being a member of the United Nations cannot act in contradiction of these 
international norms particular on matters of universal crimes. 
6.2.2 Kenya Merchant Shipping Act (2009) 
Kenya enacted the Merchant shipping Act (2009), which incorporates the provisions of 
UNCLOS and SUA, hence adopting the definitions of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships and subsequently repealing the Section 69 of the Penal Code. This legislation gives 
the elements of the offence of piracy and at the same time creates the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction desired for successful prosecution of pirates. 
The newly enacted Merchant Shipping Act (2009) was tested by case (Republic v 
Abdirahman I. M. and others 2010). The four suspected pirates were charged with the 
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offence of piracy contrary to Section 369 (1) (a) (ii) as read with section 371 (a) of the 
Merchant Shipping Act (2009). The defense Counsel argued that the trial court 
(magistrate court) had no jurisdiction to entertain any matter brought under the Merchant 
Shipping Act 2009 and only the High Court had such jurisdiction. The Counsel argued 
that the Judicature Act section 4 provides “(1) The High Court shall be a court of 
admiralty and shall exercise admiralty jurisdiction in all matters arising on the high seas, 
or in territorial waters, or upon any lake or other navigable inland waters in Kenya”. The 
defense invoked section 76 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 75 Laws of Kenya) as 
permitting a reference to the high court when a doubt arises on an issue of which court 
should try an offence. 
This matter was referred to the High Court for a decision (Republic and Abdirahaman 
2011). The judge J Ojwang held that the High Court preoccupation with admiralty 
matters was a non-criminal preoccupation essentially of maritime commerce. He further 
held that the basic jurisdiction for the trial of offence of piracy lies with courts other than 
the High Court. In Kenya, those courts are the magistrate court. The Merchant Shipping 
Act, (2009) provides that the word “court” means the High Court “unless the context 
otherwise requires”. The Judge held that the context otherwise requires in the instant 
matter-and the proper trial for the offence of piracy is the magistrate court. 
Scholars have, however, expressed different opinions on this ruling. Some have pointed 
to contradictions between section 4 of the judicature Act and Section 4 of the Criminal 
Act. The former vests exclusive jurisdiction in the high court to exercise jurisdiction in 
all admiralty matters arising on the high seas, or in territorial waters or upon any lake or 
navigable waters in Kenya. The later vest jurisdiction in both the high court and the 
subordinate courts. Another view advanced is that section 3 (2) of the Magistrates Act 
confers jurisdiction on Magistrates courts “throughout Kenya a fact strongly suggesting 
that the subordinate jurisdiction is territorial (Gathii, 2009,; Wambua, 2010, p 7). 
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The lack of clarity as to who is entitled to prosecute non Kenyan nationals who have 
committed piracy crimes outside the territorial jurisdiction of Kenya was also raised in 
an IMO consultant mission report on legislation on anti-piracy held in September 2009 
by Ashley Roach . 
6.3 Republic of Tanzania 
The United Republic of Tanzania has a common law system and has not prosecuted 
piracy cases. The country is a signatory to the main international conventions against 
piracy including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and the Convention 
for the Suppression of unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 
1988). The country has other related domestic legislation which can be used to prosecute 
pirates including the Penal Code of (1945) (as amended by Act no 14, 1980), the 
Merchant Shipping Act of 2003, Prevention of Terrorism Act (Act 21 of 2002), Proceeds 
of Crime Act (Act No 25 of 1991) and anti-money laundering Act (Act 12 of 2006). 
6.3.1 Tanzanian Penal Code 1945 (as amended) 
The Tanzanian Penal code has been the main legal framework on piracy prior to the 
incorporation of UNCLOS which defined piracy in the Merchant Shipping Act 2003. 
This legislation is, however, restricted by the territorial scope and effects on citizenship. 
The wording is framed to the effect that the courts of mainland Tanzania may exercise 
jurisdiction when an act of piracy is committed against a ship registered in the United 
Republic of Tanzania or against persons or property on board that vessel (Kamuli, 2010, 
p 55).  
Further the definition given in section 66 of the Penal Code requires an unlawful act of 
violence to have been committed against a ship or a vessel or a person onboard that ship 
or vessel. The Code does not explicitly list the acts that would amount to piracy, and that 
leaves the presiding magistrate or judge to assign a meaning to the offence. This was 
evident in Kenya in the (Hassan M.A v Republic 2008) case when the judge used 
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definitions contained in the Law of the Sea (Churchill & Lowe, 1988, p 209) to assign 
meaning to piracy. This has been argued that without an explicit description of the acts 
could infringe the principle of criminal justice.  
This lack of clarity can lead to a charge of murder on suspected pirates in the event one 
of the victims subjected to piracy dies in the process. It should be noted that many of the 
European countries have abolished death sentence in their jurisdictions and this may 
dissuade the countries from handing over captured pirates. The Memorandum on 
transfer of pirates has a specific provision that any death sentence would be commuted 
to life sentence. 
6.3.4 Tanzania Merchant Shipping Act 2003 
This is the piece of legislation which incorporates the provisions of UNCLOS Article 
101. Critics have pointed out that this legislation confines the definition of piracy and 
does not create the offence nor does it provide for punishment. What is observed is that 
the Act mentions offence under 341 and 342 of the Merchant shipping Act (2003) and in 
this case according to the methods of statute interpretation of Tanzania, introductory 
words do not constitute part of the statute. The Act however explicitly criminalizes and 
penalizes the offence of hijacking, which falls in the same part as the provision covering 
piracy in the legislation and hence it can be summed that the legislature did not intend to 
criminalize piracy. (Kamuli, 2010, p 59). 
There are provisions within the Merchant Shipping Act (2003) which stipulates the fine 
where there is no specific punishment provided, a fine of “not less than one thousand US 
dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both”, applies to these offences. 
This is the punishment one is likely to be given if charged under this section. This 
punishment to be too light to dissuade would be pirates from engaging in piracy criminal 
acts and probably the reason Tanzania has been reluctant to initiate such prosecutions. 
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6.4 Correctional facilities 
The regional country’s’ correctional facilities have been quoted to operating in more 
than double the capacity. The capacity for these facilities is fundamental to achievement 
of this article as justice includes the post-trial stage of the pirates. The research 
established that UNODC has been involved in projects aimed at increasing capacity for 
these facilities both in the region and Somalia.  
Measure could be explored at tackling the under capacity of these facilities, which in the 
past have included positive measures, such as community service programs and 
presidential prerogative.  
6.5 Extradition 
The Code envisages participants to review national legislation to facilitate extradition or 
handing over in those cases where prosecution is possible. However, different opinions 
exist as to how this process can be strengthened with some quarters citing that 
extradition remains bilateral treaty based and requires reciprocity and that piracy by law 
of nations is an extradition crime in Tanzania (Extradition Act 1965). This view is 
however contradicted by the argument that Article 100 of UNCLOS cannot be read as an 
obligation to either prosecute or extradite piracy suspects (Geiss & Petrig, 2011 p 187). 
This provision if properly implemented can be used to alleviate the burden on the 
prosecuting country, which has to deal with the after sentence challenges of deportation. 
The IMO can extend the legal assistance to include drafting of generic extradition 
instruments to guide the bilateral arrangements for countries wishing to enter into such 
treaties.  
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6.6 Challenges facing piracy trials in Kenya and Tanzania 
6.6.1 Procedural challenges 
The evidence collection and its admissibility are provided for in the Evidence Act of 
1963 which did not take into consideration the emergence of electronic imaging and that 
rules for reception of photographic evidence can only be circumvented by a case law. 
The requirement also that the evidence to prove a fact in court is direct oral evidence 
makes it mandatory for the arresting naval officers and persons who witnessed the 
piratical attacks being committed to personally attend the Court and give a testimony. 
This has created a serious problem especially with the merchant ships whose owners 
may not be ready to incur extra expenses in releasing and transporting their crew to give 
evidence in a lengthy court process. Neither video link nor photographic evidence is 
admissible to prove a case in Kenya (Wambua, 2010, p 22). The consultancy report on 
Kenya’s legislation noted that this evidence Act does not reflect the exigencies of 
detention of criminal suspects far at sea. 
There are issues with constitutional guarantees to a fair trial that require persons 
suspected to have committed criminal offences to be produced in court within 24 hours 
and those suspected of capital offence to be produced in court within 14 days from their 
arrest or commencement of their detention( Constitution of Kenya 73 (3) ). This could 
prove a challenge to piracy cases as most of the incidents take place in distant places 
making it impractical to present the suspects within the dictates of the constitution.  
There seems to have been no serious issues raised as far as piracy is concerned though 
the local courts in some cases have dismissed cases on the grounds of rights of accused 
persons (Cisse Djibra v Republic 2008) 
Witness attendance at trials has been claimed as a challenge by the prosecution team in 
Kenya where the burden of producing witnesses is left to them. Whereas there have been 
agreement with the arresting countries to avail witnesses during trials, there still exists a 
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challenge when it comes to the seafarers’ witnesses whose companies may not be 
willing to incur the extra cost of flying the witnesses to attend trials which are lengthy. 
6.6.2 Criminal Prosecution of non- nationals 
In Tanzania the Penal Code Act (1945 as amended) establishes a statutory procedure 
where any proceedings for the trial of any foreigner who commits an offence within the 
territorial waters of Tanzania should not be instituted in court except with the leave of 
the director of public prosecution. 
The Code further provides that in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him, the 
director of prosecution is obliged to exercise his own discretion and shall not be subject 
to directions or control of any person except the president. This provision restricts 
prosecution based on arrangements, such as the Djibouti Code, which will require 
further presidential guidance to institute prosecution on non-citizen. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The chapter concludes that the provisions of UNCLOS are adequate in defining piracy 
and the elements of the offence are well covered. In the domestic legislation matters of 
procedure seem to play a major role in determining cases brought before the domestic 
courts( Republic v Abdirahaman & others 2010)  
This calls for an all-inclusive review of both the main and related subsidiary legislation 
to avoid inconsistencies, which have been quoted as potential challenges to successful 
prosecution of piracy cases in the region. This leads to the conclusion that the process of 
transforming international conventions to domestic law is a crucial step with far 
reaching consequences if not done comprehensively.   
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Chapter 7 
Existing regional cooperative arrangements: Avenues for Synergy 
“In the long history of humankind (and animal kind too) those who learned 
to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed”. (Charles 
Darwin 1809-1882) 
7.1 Introduction 
In the modern era of globalization, the role and rise of transnational actors have come to 
challenge the traditional approach to international relations dominated by a realist school 
with emphasis on state actors. The liberal approach advanced by theorist such, as 
Keohane and Nye seem to have gained popularity in the last decade with complex 
transnational connections and interdependence increasing while the use of military and 
power balancing is decreasing, though they remain important. 
The drafters of the Code appears to subscribe to this theory given the fact that the Code 
envisions this transnational and interdependence cooperation even though the emphasis 
is on the region. This chapter explores the existing regional cooperative arrangements 
both political and military with a view to identifying potential avenues of synergy at the 
same time eliminating duplication of efforts in the pursuit of implementing the Code. 
7.2  Short term strategy on containment 
7.2.1 Shared Awareness and “De-confliction” (SHADE) mechanism 
The SHADE mechanism was initiated in December 2008 by those nations and 
organizations involved in counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin with 
a purpose of conducting informal meetings to share best practices and de-conflict the 
activities of the players. Initially it was composed of Combined Maritime Force, NATO 
and EUNAVOR but was later expanded to include most of the Nations contributing 
naval assets including Japan, China Republic of South Korea and Russia. 
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The SHADE is credited with the establishment of the International Recommended 
Transit Corridor (IRTC) endorsed by IMO in July 2009. This corridor has been very 
effective in conducting escort missions of merchant ships and played a big role in 
reducing the pirate attacks in the Gulf in recent years. 
The IMO short term strategy as articulated by the Secretary General in various forums 
including the speech for 2011maritime day remains containment and thwarting of pirate 
attacks at sea. This can only be accomplished by use of naval vessels deployed at sea 
making this grouping of now expanded 22 countries the most ideal partner for the time 
being. It should also be noted that the mechanism holds monthly meetings where issues 
affecting their operations are discussed. IMO is represented in these monthly meeting 
hence has the opportunity of articulating the Organization and the Code strategies as far 
as Djibouti Code is concerned. 
7.2.2 Adoption of the Best Management Practice (BMP) 
The best management practices were developed by the CGPS working group 3 chaired 
by the United States and comprising of some member States and the industry. This set of 
practices was meant to assist ships to avoid or delay attacks while transiting in defined 
high risk areas. The advice entails advising ships to register with UKMTO and the MSC-
HOA security information center to following the (IRTC). Other measures included are 
ship protection and deterrent measures deemed appropriate in reducing vulnerability of 
the ship. 
The practices cover areas such as pre planning stage, where it recommends a thorough 
risk assessments based on the piracy activity information from various sources listed in 
the handbook. The risk analysis should identify among other things measures for 
prevention, mitigation and recovery. It should also be noted that these guidelines 
includes advice on use of Private Contracted Armed Security personnel PCASPs despite 
the fact that the industry has not supported their use on long term. The Djibouti Code 
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States could adopt recommendatory measures based on these best practices in their role 
as Flag and Port States. 
7.2.3 The Combined Joint Task Force –Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) 
This US combined Task Force was established in November 2002 operating aboard USS 
Mount Whitney arriving in the Horn of Africa December 2002 and transitioned ashore to 
Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in May 2003. The creation of this Task force followed the 
invasion of the US and UK of Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of the Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT) to capture Osama Bin Laden and destroy Al Qaeda. Initially 
under the CENTCOM its mission was to capture terrorists who could flood the Horn of 
Africa from the Middle East. 
The CJTF-HOA Area of Responsibility (AOR) includes the countries of Kenya, 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Seychelles with a further interest being 
Yemen, Tanzania, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Comoros, 
Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. 
This Task Force mission has however evolved to conducting operations in the combined 
joint operation area to enhance partner nation’s capacity, promote regional security and 
stability, dissuade conflict and protect US and Coalition interest. The future plans based 
on a committee report to Congress (2011-2012) indicates a mission with a long term 
objective in the region making it a preferred partner in the realization of the Code 
objective. 
7.3 Midterm strategy on capacity building 
7.3.1 Maritime Safety and Security related cooperative arrangements 
The IMO has been involved in maritime security issues with one of its committee the 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) having a permanent agenda on piracy. The adoption 
of both hard and soft law frameworks on safety of navigation such as the SUA 
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convention and the ISPS Code in 2002 and numerous recommendations makes the 
organization a central player in maritime security issues. The ongoing work of the MSC 
on recommendations on use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) 
on board ships is an indicator of dynamism and expertise possessed by the Organization. 
This makes the organizations existing arrangement the preferred choice among other 
regional arrangements. 
The role of Port State Control (PSC) is hailed as one of the major achievements of IMO 
in ridding the industry of unseaworthy ships. This arrangement is replicated in most 
regions following the signing of Paris Memorandum of Understanding by mostly 
European region. The Indian Ocean region is covered by the Indian Ocean 
Memorandum of understanding on Port State Control (IOMoU) with current 
membership of 19. Most of these members are signatory to the Code with exceptions of 
Australia, India, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. The rest of the 15 members are eligible 
members of the Djibouti Code. Members of Djibouti Code who are not members of 
IOMoU are Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate (UAE). 
Table 7: Venn illustration diagram, Djibouti Code of Conduct and IOMoU 
 
Figure: 7 
Source: Djibouti Code of Conduct; Indian Ocean Memorandum of understanding 
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In evaluating how this MoU can be incorporated into the anti-piracy roles, a product-
market strategy business model developed by Igor Ansoff (1918-2002) is used. 
Table 8: Anti-Piracy growth strategy matrix 
 
 
Figure 8 
Source: Mc Graw, (1965), corporate Strategy: An analytic approach to business policy for growth and 
expansion 
On applying the market penetration concept, Ansoff considers measures such as increase 
of market share of current products. In this case, the IOMoU could extend to those 
countries in the Indian and Gulf region who are not members such as Egypt and other 
Mediterranean countries granting them observer status. Other means of achieving this 
penetration strategy would include securing dominance of the existing PSC measures by 
Penetration Development 
Development Diversification 
Existing (PSC) New (Anti-Piracy) 
New Djibouti Members 
Existing  IOMoU 
Members 
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aggressive campaigns and increasing the port state control inspections of the member 
countries. 
The product and market development would include introduction of anti-piracy 
measures within the PSC regime and in particular those inspections related to the ISPS 
Code. Measures as those developed in the Best Management Practices could be 
incorporated in the inspections to ensure these ships operating in the region are 
complying with the recommendations and have these copies on board as part of the anti-
piracy kit. This strategy can also see the members adopt a common policy on ships using 
PCASP when calling on member ports to avoid possible detentions which could arise 
through their presence on board. The fourth strategy of the market diversification cited 
as the most risky by market strategist would be to introduce these anti-piracy measures 
to other regions such as the neighboring Riyadh MoU. 
7.3.2 Security cooperative arrangement: The East Africa Standby Force 
The EASF is part of the five regional forces under the African Union Standby Force 
with its headquarters in Addis Ababa. This standby force draw its mandate under the 
United Nations Charter Chapter VII on maintenance of peace and the African Union 
Peace and Security Commission Protocol on Peace and Security adopted in May 2003 in 
Addis Ababa. The EASF covers 13 countries in the horn of Africa which includes 10 
Djibouti Code participants namely Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia and Sudan. The three members not part of 
the Code are Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. It should be noted that Uganda and Burundi 
have contributed troops in the AU peace keeping mission in Somalia. 
The EASF has a standby brigade arrangement, the East Africa Brigade (EASBRIG) 
which comprises a full time planning element (PLANELM) based in Nairobi, Kenya 
comprising 15 staff members drawn from civilian police and the military and a further 
list of brigade staff on call in member states. The brigade has units which are on standby 
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in the member states and are subject to verification visit by PLANELM to identify 
standards and shortfalls. This force carried out a joint field training exercise “AMANI 
CARANA” in Djibouti in November 2009, which tested the application of principles of 
the peace support operation doctrine in a failed state “CARANA” 
EASBRIG enjoys support of the regional countries through the regional economic and 
political body of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and has already 
attracted funding from European countries such as the UK under the peace support 
mission, the Netherlands and Norway who also have funded a consultative work on 
incorporating a naval component of the force by the year 2015.The IMO and the PIU 
through the Regional office based in Nairobi could partner with the PLANELM in areas 
of training of personnel from this organization who has considerable potential as a long 
term substitute for the current deployed naval forces on the expiry of their mandate. 
Table 9: Venn illustration of Djibouti Code members and EASBRIG 
 
Figure 9 
Source: Djibouti Code of Conduct (2009) IGAD Secretariat (2004), Protocol for EASBRICOM 
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7.3.3 Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established following an 
African Union Peace and Security Commission decision in 2007 to assist the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia to consolidate its position after the 
withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in the same year. This force which to date total up to 
8,000 troops comprises of 9 infantry battalions and support staff. The mandate 
AMISOM is to conduct peace and support operations in Somalia, to stabilize the 
situation and create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities by protecting 
the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI). The mission has been extended to 31 August 
2012 a projected time for handing over to the United Nations in accordance with the 
force concept of operation. 
This is the only unit inside Somalia with the law enforcement capability which IMO 
could incorporate in the attainment of its midterm strategy of undermining organized 
criminal elements by denying them access to their operational bases both on land and 
along the coast where hijacked ships are anchored awaiting ransom negotiations. The 
force is set to get additional 3,000 troops in December 2011 according to Wafula 
Wamunyinyi the deputy special representative of the chairperson of the African Union 
Commission. This will boost the force in consolidating the positions they have been 
holding in Mogadishu and the outlying areas after driving the Al-Shabaab militias linked 
to Al Qaeda terrorist group in August.  Priority could be given to those areas currently 
perceived as pirate strongholds of Hardhere, Macca, Eyl and Hobyo in the next phase of 
expansion of AMISOM to new areas of operation.  
7.4 Long term strategy 
7.4.1 The East and South Africa-Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) Strategy 
The ESA-IO regional strategy action plan for 2010 was adopted by the second regional 
ministerial meeting on piracy and maritime security held in Mauritius 2010.The regional 
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strategy has three pillars with the first pillar being the development and implementation 
of the Somali action plan by IGAD, encouraging states in the region to carry out 
prosecution of pirates and strengthening of regional capacity to secure their maritime 
zones. The secretariat is composed of Inter-Regional Coordination Committee (IRCC) 
which consists of Common Market for Easter and Southern Africa (COMESA), Indian 
Ocean Commission (IOC) Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and EU. 
The pillars of this organization are similar to the objectives of the Djibouti Code, hence 
the need to partner with this group particular on the implementation on the first pillar on 
the Somali action plan where the focus is on inter Somali dialogue, reconstruction of key 
Somali institution and dialogue with international community to mobilize resources to 
revive growth of economic activities which are key to provision of alternative livelihood 
not fully covered in the Djibouti Code as part of the long term solution. 
7.4.2 South West Indian Fisheries Commission (SWIFCO)  
SWIFCO was established in 2004 by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), a 
United Nations body charged with a mandate to promote sustainable utilization of 
marine resources in the region of South West Indian Ocean. The members of the 
commission are the Comoros, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius 
Mozambique, the Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa Tanzania and Yemen who are all 
participants of the Djibouti Code. 
In executing its functions in the region such as assisting fishery managers in the 
development and implementation of fishery management systems, the commission 
provides an opportunity to revive the fishing sector in Somalia, which is a key economic 
lifeline of the Somali fishing community destroyed by successive years of illegal and 
unregulated fishing. The commission could also assist the fishing community to 
accessing markets for their catches. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has identified a group of players considered central in partnership and 
providing the necessary synergy in the restoration of sanity in Somalia and the adjacent 
maritime areas. In a congested field of multiple players, there exist a challenge to this 
synergy which may result to duplication of efforts leading to waste of scarce resources 
and hence the need for the movers of Djibouti Code to embrace an approach which focus 
on partnership in repression of piracy in the region in all aspects of a short, medium and 
long term strategy. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussions and Conclusions 
8.1 Piracy criminal acts 
Piracy criminal acts remain a threat to shipping and freedom of navigation with statistics 
showing that there were 22 ships held with 462 seafarers awaiting payment of ransom in 
deplorable conditions in Somalia in July 2011(IMO, 2011). The economic cost of piracy 
is estimated to be between $7 to $12 billion to the industry with considerable human cost 
through death, torture and psychological trauma on captured seafarers and their families 
(Bowden 2010, ITF 2011). 
The piracy business model points to the role played by sea gangs as contributing to 40%, 
leaving the remaining 60% to the shore based organizers who comprise the sponsors 
cum investors and shore security. Efforts must be geared to tackling the shore 
organizers, who are fueling the piracy at sea, through reinvestment of ransom money in 
recruitment of youths including juveniles and supplying the logistics enabling the pirates 
to extend their range of operations. 
Somali pirates’ mode of operation involves forcefully boarding a ship, commandeer it to 
Somali coast and then demand ransom to release the captured seafarers. The hostage 
taking of two tourists in the neighboring Kenya resorts located more than 60nm using 
speedboats and the hijacking of MT Fairchem Bogey after it disembarked the PCASP is 
a pointer to the changing tactics of the pirates in their attempt to beat the measures 
adopted by international navies at sea and the industry. As long as the reward for ransom 
payment exceeds the risks associated, there will be new recruits willing to engage in 
these criminal acts.  Measures should be adopted aimed at increasing probability of 
detection, capture and conviction to dissuade would-be pirates.  
The case of South East Asia shows that the pirate attacks went down after the littoral 
states carried out joint operations and signed the ReCAAP. The Djibouti Code holds the 
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potential of bringing down these acts, but requires revival of governance institutions in 
Somalia to establish a rule of law and deny the pirates and militant groups such as Al 
Shabaab operating bases on land. 
8.2 Regional cooperation mechanism-text analysis. 
The setting of the Code text was influenced by UNSC Resolutions 1816 (2008), 1838 
(2008) and 1846 (2008) on Somalia, which stand out as the most progressing resolutions 
in the fight against Somali pirates and credited with mobilizing one of the largest flotilla 
in modern time on maritime law enforcement with up to 32 ships deployed in the region. 
The invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the UNSC is a further indication of 
the political support given to the problem of piracy in the region. 
The concept of the main articles is based on existing practices elsewhere with the 
information sharing mechanism having contributed to a reduction of piracy incidents in 
South East Asia. In the region there existing information sharing centers, such as 
UKMTO, NATO Security Center and EEU MSC-HOA who have been instrumental in 
coordinating escorts and military interventions. On review of national legislation, 
successful prosecution have been instituted following the enactment of the Kenya 
Merchant Shipping Act (2009), an indication that the article once implemented by other 
participants will enable prosecution to be instituted and concluded. 
The Code is still not binding despite the fact that the participants intended to have a 
binding instrument by January 2011. This has however not impacted on the 
implementation of the Code. The process to a binding instrument will need careful 
consideration of some aspects such as regional leadership, hegemonic stability factor 
and regional state interest cited as key to any international cooperation by the realist 
school of international relations. The case of Malaysia and Indonesia having not signed 
to ReCAAP should serve as a lesson as participants move to the next level of a binding 
agreement. 
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8.3 Embarkation of Law enforcement officers 
The research established that this concept though key to overcoming prosecutorial 
challenges faced by the navies deployed has not been realized. The reasons point to the 
fact that these agreements are bilateral and specific and have political considerations 
such as reciprocity and sovereignty which may be subject to protracted diplomatic 
negotiations before conclusion. 
The countries contributing naval assets in the region are not eligible participants to the 
Code with an exception of France, which has also not signed the Code despite having 
contributed to the IMO Trust Fund. This leaves the regional countries with the role of 
only providing the law enforcement officers to host countries willing to embark them on 
board which further restricts the realization of the concept. 
There are reservations from legal point of view on the use of the “shipriders” in the high 
seas as this has been cited to contradict the principle of one ship one flag rule in 
UNCLOS and further conflicts article 107 which requires the arresting government 
vessel to be clearly marked. This argument restricts the use of the “shipriders” to the 
territorial seas of the embarked law enforcement officer.  
8.4 Information sharing mechanism 
The research found that there exist sufficient systems and technologies both in the 
shipping industry and in the field of maritime domain awareness which could be adopted 
for use in the attainment of this article of the Code. The system could be based on IMO 
approved basic communications systems in SOLAS to benefit from the performance 
standard criteria already established. 
The Naval forces operating in the region have established a web based piracy 
information sharing centers which includes the NATO Security Center and EU MSC-
HOA where ships gain access to the latest piracy information and alerts. The website 
enables ships to register their movements electronically. The implementers could 
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explore the possibility of complementing these existing systems by linking them with 
the regional piracy information centers. Considerations should be made to the fact that 
the forces information centers are tied up to the mission of the task force and are subject 
to expire in December 2012. These services could be taken over by the regional piracy 
information centers on the occasion that the mission is discontinued. 
8.5 Review of Regional National Legislations 
The research established that the international law on repressing piracy and armed 
robbery as codified in UNCLOS and SUA are sufficient in addressing piracy. The 
municipal laws of the regional states and the procedures are, however, the ones which 
determine whether a country has sufficient jurisdiction to prosecute persons accused of 
committing piracy at high seas or territorial waters of a failed state. 
The nexus clause in the execution of universal jurisdiction is found to be retrogressive in 
the modern shipping business practice. This is complicated by the wider number of 
stakeholders involved in a single business venture who represent ship owners, seafarers, 
insurers, Flag states, business managers and others. The concluded pirate cases in Kenya 
proved that the universal jurisdiction established under UNCLOS is sufficient and 
adequate in carrying out prosecution of pirates arrested by third parties. 
The capacity for correctional facilities in the regional countries carrying out pirate trials 
is a factor, which if not solved, may see the countries become reluctant in accepting 
arrested pirates. This could be solved by having prison transfer arrangements in the 
region which would ease the burden for the prosecuting countries by having the 
convicted pirates serve their sentences in a third state party. However, this requires 
elaborate bilateral arrangements on extradition of pirates which has to address some 
fundamental issues such as reciprocity, human rights, constitutional guarantees and 
death sentences contained in some jurisdictions. 
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In June 2011 the Working Group 2 of CGPCS estimated that there are close to 1000 
pirates either convicted or going on trial in 20 countries. This means that there exist 
sufficient case laws which could be used to influence the course of review of the Code 
Participants’ national legislation. 
8.6 Avenues for synergy 
There exist players in the region who are currently involved in the activities of 
repressing piracy in the region both at sea and land. This paper finds the SHADE 
mechanism the most appropriate partner in the attainment of short term goal of 
containment of piracy. The industry guidance through the Best Management Practices 
for Protection against Somalia based Piracy (BMP), now in its 4
th
 edition, has also been 
established as having an effect in reducing the successful pirate attacks in many cases 
hence its incorporation in the short term could be considered. 
The EASBRIG mechanism of the East Africa Standby Force has the potential of 
stabilizing the region owing to its wide regional participation and its strategic plan for 
incorporation of a naval component of the regions Standby force by 2015. This regional 
military alliance can be an alternative to the Combined Maritime Forces operating in the 
region once their mandate expires. 
The revival of economic institutions alongside the political institutions in Somalia holds 
a key to provision of alternative livelihood. UNODC has been involved in rebuilding of 
prison facilities both in Puntland, Somaliland and Somalia. Similar efforts could be 
instituted to revive the fishing sector in the long term to dissuade the fisher folk 
community from becoming pirates. The establishment of Somalia maritime zones could 
be prioritized to provide for territorial jurisdiction and Economic Exploitation Zone to 
enable the government to manage the fishing industry and earn revenue through 
licensing regime. 
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8.7 Conclusions 
The following International organizations are core to the realization of the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct. The United Nations, through the UNSC whose mandate of preservation of 
peace can be invoked to revive law and order in Somalia and continued deployment of 
Military assets in the region, the UNDP, who have the capacity to provide alternative 
livelihood to Somalia through its development role and  the UNODC which has been 
rebuilding incarceration facilities inside Somalia.  
Member States have a duty to protect ships flying their flags and their citizen who serve 
under these Flags. UNCLOS also obligates states to cooperate to the fullest possible 
extend in repression of piracy on the high seas. This research concludes that the 
following States have a stake in the fight against piracy, The US through its policy on 
Global War on Terror and its program on Maritime Domain Awareness, France through 
its territories in the Indian Ocean, Kenya Ethiopia and Djibouti who are neighboring 
States to the failed State of Somalia and whose national security is threatened by the 
lawlessness State of Somalia. 
The industry which bears the brunt of piracy should keep pressure on the state actors to 
attract the political will required to protect the vital industry and guarantee the freedom 
of navigation in the high seas. The industry could also embrace the best management 
practices and carry out appropriate risk assessments while operating in these high risk 
areas. 
The IMO roles in the attainment of the overall objective of the Djibouti Code remain 
core and require concentrated effort and engagement with the international community, 
Member States and the industry beyond its traditional mandate of safer ships on cleaner 
oceans. This call for adoption of dynamic and proactive strategies such as 2011 year’s 
theme, “piracy: orchestrating response”. 
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ANNEX 
 
CODE OF CONDUCT  
CONCERNING THE REPRESSION 
OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS  
IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN AND THE GULF OF ADEN  
 
 The Governments of Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Participants”), 
 
DEEPLY CONCERNED about the crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships in 
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden and the grave dangers to the safety and security 
of persons and ships at sea and to the protection of the marine environment arising from such 
acts;  
  
REAFFIRMING that international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, sets out the legal 
framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea;  
 
 NOTING that the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter 
referred to as “IMO”), at its twenty-fifth regular session,  adopted, on 27 November 2007, 
resolution A.1002(25) on Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of 
Somalia which, among other things, called upon Governments in the region to conclude, in co-
operation with IMO, and implement, as soon as possible, a regional agreement to prevent, deter 
and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships;   
 
 NOTING ALSO that the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its sixth-third 
session, adopted, on 5 December 2008, resolution 63/111 on Ocean and the law of the sea which 
amongst others: 
 
- recognizes the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional, sub-
regional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with international law, 
threats to maritime security, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, terrorist acts 
against shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests, through 
bilateral and multilateral instruments and mechanisms aimed at monitoring, 
preventing and responding to such threats, the enhanced sharing of information 
among States relevant to the detection, prevention and suppression of such threats, 
the prosecution of offenders with due regard to national legislation and the need 
for sustained capacity-building to support such objectives;  
 
- emphasizes the importance of prompt reporting of incidents to enable accurate 
information on the scope of the problem of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships and, in the case of armed robbery against ships, by affected vessels to the 
coastal State, underlines the importance of effective information-sharing with 
States potentially affected by incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships, 
and takes note of the important role of the IMO; 
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- calls upon States to take appropriate steps under their national law to facilitate the 
apprehension and prosecution of those who are alleged to have committed acts of 
piracy;  
 
- urges all States, in cooperation with the IMO, to actively combat piracy and armed 
robbery at sea by adopting measures, including those relating to assistance with 
capacity-building through training of seafarers, port staff and enforcement 
personnel in the prevention, reporting and investigation of incidents, bringing the 
alleged perpetrators to justice, in accordance with international law, and by 
adopting national legislation, as well as providing enforcement vessels and 
equipment and guarding against fraudulent ship registration; 
 
- welcomes the significant decrease in the number of attacks by pirates and armed 
robbers in the Asian region through increased national, bilateral and trilateral 
initiatives as well as regional cooperative mechanisms, and calls upon other States 
to give immediate attention to adopting, concluding and implementing 
cooperation agreements on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships at 
the regional level;  
 
- expresses serious concern regarding the problem of increased instances of piracy 
and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, expresses alarm in particular at 
the recent hijacking of vessels, supports the recent efforts to address this problem 
at the global and regional levels, notes the adoption by the Security Council of the 
United Nations of resolutions 1816 (2008) of 2 June 2008 and 1838 (2008) of 7 
October 2008, and also notes that the authorization in resolution 1816 (2008) and 
the provisions in resolution 1838 (2008) apply only to the situation in Somalia and 
do not affect the rights, obligations or responsibilities of Member States of the 
United Nations under international law, including any rights or obligations under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as 
“UNCLOS”), with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular 
that they are not to be considered as establishing customary international law;  
 
- notes the initiatives of the Secretary-General of the IMO, following up on 
resolution A.1002(25) to engage the international community in efforts to combat 
acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships sailing the waters off the coast of 
Somalia; and 
 
- urges States to ensure the full implementation of resolution A.1002(25) on acts of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia; 
 
 NOTING FURTHER that the Security Council of the United Nations has adopted 
resolutions 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008) in relation to piracy and 
armed robbery in waters off the coast of Somalia, 
 
 RECALLING the Assembly of IMO, at its twenty-second regular session, adopted, on 29 
November 2001, resolution A.922(22) on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes 
of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which amongst others invited Governments to 
develop, as appropriate, agreements and procedures to facilitate co-operation in applying 
efficient and effective measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships; 
 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the Special measures to enhance maritime security adopted 
on 12 December 2002 by the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International 
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Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended, including the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code; 
 
INSPIRED by the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia  adopted in Tokyo, Japan on 11 November 2004; 
 
 RECOGNIZING the urgent need to devise and adopt effective and practical measures for 
the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships;  
 
 RECALLING that the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (hereinafter referred to as “SUA Convention”) provides  for 
parties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery or persons 
responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof 
or any other form of intimidation;
 
 
DESIRING to promote greater regional co-operation between the Participants, and 
thereby enhance their effectiveness, in the prevention, interdiction, prosecution, and punishment 
of those persons engaging in piracy and armed robbery against ships on the basis of mutual 
respect for the sovereignty, sovereign rights, sovereign equality, jurisdiction, and territorial 
integrity of States; 
 
 WELCOMING the initiatives of IMO, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
the United Nations Development Programme, European Commission, League of Arab States, and 
other relevant international entities to provide training, technical assistance and other forms of 
capacity building to assist Governments, upon request, to adopt and implement practical 
measures to apprehend and prosecute those persons engaging in piracy and armed robbery 
against ships;   
 
 WELCOMING the creation in New York on 14 January 2009 of the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the coast of Somalia which will help mobilize and co-ordinate contributions to 
international efforts in the fight against piracy and armed robbery against ships in the waters off 
the coast of Somalia, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1851(2008);  
 
 NOTING FURTHER the need for a comprehensive approach to address the poverty and 
instability that create conditions conducive to piracy, which includes strategies for effective 
environmental conservation and fisheries management, and the need to address the possible 
environmental consequences of piracy;  
 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
 
Article 1 
 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this Code of conduct, unless the context otherwise requires: 
 
1. “Piracy” consists of any of the following acts: 
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(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, 
and directed: 
 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a) or (b). 
 
2. “Armed robbery against ships” consists of any of the following acts: 
 
(a) unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, 
other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship 
or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal 
waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea; 
 
(b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a). 
 
3. “Secretary-General” means the Secretary-General of the International Maritime 
Organization. 
 
 
Article 2 
 
Purpose and Scope 
 
1. Consistent with their available resources and related priorities, their respective national 
laws and regulations, and applicable rules of international law, the Participants intend to co-
operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
with a view towards: 
 
(a) sharing and reporting relevant information; 
 
(b) interdicting ships and/or aircraft suspected of engaging in piracy or armed robbery 
against ships; 
 
(c) ensuring that persons committing or attempting to commit piracy or armed 
robbery against ships are apprehended and prosecuted; and 
 
(d) facilitating proper care, treatment, and repatriation for seafarers, fishermen, other 
shipboard personnel and passengers subject to piracy or armed robbery against 
ships, particularly those who have been subjected to violence. 
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2. The Participants intend this Code of conduct to be applicable in relation to piracy and 
armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. 
 
 
Article 3 
 
Protection Measures for Ships 
 
The Participants intend to encourage States, ship owners, and ship operators, where 
appropriate, to take protective measures against piracy and armed robbery against ships, taking 
into account the relevant international standards and practices, and, in particular, 
recommendations
1,2
 adopted by IMO.  
 
 
Article 4 
 
Measures to Repress Piracy 
 
1. The provisions of this Article are intended to apply only to piracy. 
 
2. For purposes of this Article and of Article 10, “pirate ship” means a ship intended by the 
persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing piracy, or if the ship has 
been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of those persons. 
 
3. Consistent with Article 2, each Participant to the fullest possible extent intends to co-
operate in: 
 
(a) arresting, investigating, and prosecuting persons who have committed piracy or 
are reasonably suspected of committing piracy; 
 
(b) seizing pirate ships and/or aircraft and the property on board such ships and/or 
aircraft; and 
 
(c) rescuing ships, persons, and property subject to piracy. 
 
4. Any Participant may seize a pirate ship beyond the outer limit of any State’s territorial 
sea, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. 
 
5. Any pursuit of a ship, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is 
engaged in piracy, extending in and over the territorial sea of a Participant is subject to the 
authority of that Participant.  No Participant should pursue such a ship in or over the territory or 
territorial sea of any coastal State without the permission of that State.  
 
6. Consistent with international law, the courts of the Participant which carries out a seizure 
pursuant to paragraph 4 may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine 
the action to be taken with regard to the ship or property, subject to the rights of third parties 
acting in good faith. 
                                                 
1
  MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 on Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed 
robbery against ships as it may be revised. 
2
  MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 on Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and 
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships as it may be revised. 
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7. The Participant which carried out the seizure pursuant to paragraph 4 may, subject to its 
national laws, and in consultation with other interested entities, waive its primary right to 
exercise jurisdiction and authorize any other Participant to enforce its laws against the ship 
and/or persons on board. 
 
8. Unless otherwise arranged by the affected Participants, any seizure made in the territorial 
sea of a Participant pursuant to paragraph 5 should be subject to the jurisdiction of that 
Participant. 
 
 
Article 5 
 
Measures to Repress Armed Robbery against Ships 
 
1. The provisions of this Article are intended to apply only to armed robbery against ships. 
 
2. The Participants intend for operations to suppress armed robbery against ships in the 
territorial sea and airspace of a Participant to be subject to the authority of that Participant, 
including in the case of hot pursuit from that Participant’s territorial sea or archipelagic waters in 
accordance with Article 111 of UNCLOS. 
 
3. The Participants intend for their respective focal points and Centres (as designated 
pursuant to Article 8) to communicate expeditiously alerts, reports, and information related to 
armed robbery against ships to other Participants and interested parties.  
 
 
Article 6 
 
Measures in All Cases 
 
1. The Participants intend that any measures taken pursuant to this Code of conduct should 
be carried out by law enforcement or other authorized officials from warships or military aircraft, 
or from other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being in government service and 
authorized to that effect. 
 
2. The Participants recognize that multiple States, including the flag State, State of 
suspected origin of the perpetrators, the State of nationality of persons on board the ship, and the 
State of ownership of cargo may have legitimate interests in cases arising pursuant to Articles 4 
and 5.  Therefore, the Participants intend to liaise and co-operate with such States and other 
stakeholders, and to coordinate such activities with each other to facilitate the rescue, 
interdiction, investigation, and prosecution.  
 
3. The Participants intend, to the fullest possible extent, to conduct and support the conduct 
of investigations in cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships taking into account the 
relevant international standards and practices, and, in particular, recommendations
3
 adopted by 
IMO.  
 
                                                 
3
  Resolution A.922(22) on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships as it may be revised. 
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4. The Participants intend to co-operate to the fullest possible extent in medical and 
decedent affairs arising from operations in furtherance of the repression of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships. 
 
 
Article 7 
 
Embarked Officers 
 
1. In furtherance of operations contemplated by this Code of conduct, a Participant may 
nominate law enforcement or other authorized officials (hereafter referred to as “the embarked 
officers”) to embark in the patrol ships or aircraft of another Participant (hereafter referred to as 
“the host Participant”) as may be authorized by the host Participant.   
 
2. The embarked officers may be armed in accordance with their national law and policy 
and the approval of the host Participant.   
 
3. When embarked, the host Participant should facilitate communications between the 
embarked officers and their headquarters, and should provide messing and quarters for the 
embarked officers aboard the patrol ships or aircraft in a manner consistent with host Participant 
personnel of the same rank.   
 
4. Embarked officers may assist the host Participant and conduct operations from the host 
Participant ship or aircraft if expressly requested to do so by the host Participant, and only in the 
manner requested.  Such request may only be made, agreed to, and acted upon in a manner that is 
not prohibited by the laws and policies of both Participants. 
 
 
Article 8 
 
Coordination and Information Sharing 
 
1. Each Participant should designate a national focal point to facilitate coordinated, timely, 
and effective information flow among the Participants consistent with the purpose and scope of 
this Code of conduct.  In order to ensure coordinated, smooth, and effective communications 
between their designated focal points, the Participants intend to use the piracy information 
exchange centres Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Centres”). The Centres in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania will be situated in the 
maritime rescue co-odination centre in Mombasa and the sub-regional co-ordination centre in 
Dar es Salaam, respectively.  The Centre in Yemen will be situated in the regional maritime 
information centre to be established in Yemen based on the outcomes of the sub-regional 
meetings held by IMO in Sana’a in 2005 and Muscat in 2006 and Dar es Salaam.  Each Centre 
and designated focal point should be capable of receiving and responding to alerts and requests 
for information or assistance at all times. 
 
2. Each Participant intends to: 
 
(a) declare and communicate to the other Participants its designated focal point at the 
time of signing this Code of conduct or as soon as possible after signing, and 
thereafter update the information as and when changes occur;  
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(b) provide and communicate to the other Participants the telephone numbers, telefax 
numbers, and e-mail addresses of its focal point, and, as appropriate, of its Centre 
and thereafter update the information as and when changes occur; and 
 
(c) communicate to the Secretary-General the information referred to in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) and thereafter update the information as and when 
changes occur. 
 
3. Each Centre and focal point should be responsible for its communication with the other 
focal points and the Centres.  Any focal point which has received or obtained information about 
an imminent threat of, or an incident of, piracy or armed robbery against ships should promptly 
disseminate an alert with all relevant information to the Centres.  The Centres should disseminate 
appropriate alerts within their respective areas of responsibility regarding imminent threats or 
incidents to ships.  
 
4. Each Participant should ensure the smooth and effective communication between its 
designated focal point, and other competent national authorities including search and rescue 
coordination centres, as well as relevant non-governmental organizations. 
 
5. Each Participant should make every effort to require ships entitled to fly its flag and the 
owners  and operators of such ships to promptly notify relevant national authorities, including the 
designated focal points and Centres, the appropriate search and rescue coordination centres and 
other relevant the contact points
4
, of incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships. 
 
6. Each Participant intends, upon the request of any other Participant, to respect the 
confidentiality of information transmitted from a Participant. 
 
7. To facilitate implementation of this Code of conduct, the Participants intend to keep each 
other fully informed concerning their respective applicable laws and guidance, particularly those 
pertaining to the interdiction, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, and disposition of persons 
involved in piracy and armed robbery against ships.  The Participants may also undertake and 
seek assistance to undertake publication of handbooks and convening of seminars and 
conferences in furtherance of this Code of conduct. 
 
 
Article 9 
 
Incident Reporting 
 
1. The Participants intend to undertake development of uniform reporting criteria in order to 
ensure that an accurate assessment of the threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Western 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is developed taking into account the recommendations
5,6
 
adopted by IMO. The Participants intend for the Centres to manage the collection and 
dissemination of this information in their respective geographic areas of responsibility. 
 
                                                 
4  For example the Maritime Liaison Office Bahrain (MARLO), the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Office 
Dubai (UKMTO). 
5
  MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 on Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed 
robbery against ships as it may be revised. 
6
  MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 on Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and 
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships as it may be revised. 
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2. Consistent with its laws and policies, a Participant conducting a boarding, investigation, 
prosecution, or judicial proceeding pursuant to this Code of conduct should promptly notify any 
affected flag and coastal States and the Secretary-General of the results.    
 
3. The Participants intend for the Centres to: 
 
(a) collect, collate and analyze the information transmitted by the Participants 
concerning piracy and armed robbery against ships, including other relevant 
information relating to individuals and transnational organized criminal groups 
committing  piracy and armed robbery against ships in their respective 
geographical areas of responsibility; and 
 
(b) prepare statistics and reports on the basis of the information gathered and analyzed 
under subparagraph (a), and to disseminate them to the Participants, the shipping 
community, and the Secretary-General. 
 
 
Article 10 
 
Assistance among Participants 
 
1. A Participant may request any other Participant, through the Centres or directly, to 
co-operate in detecting any of the following persons, ships, or aircraft: 
 
(a) persons who have committed, or are reasonably suspected of committing, piracy;  
 
(b) persons who have committed, or are reasonably suspected of committing, armed 
robbery against ships;  
 
(c) pirate ships, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that those ships are 
engaged in piracy; and 
 
(d) ships or persons who have been subjected to  piracy or armed robbery against 
ships. 
 
2. A Participant may also request any other Participant, through the Centres or directly, to 
take effective measures in response to reported piracy or armed robbery against ships. 
 
3. Co-operative arrangements such as joint exercises or other forms of co-operation, as 
appropriate, may be undertaken as determined by the Participants concerned.  
 
4. Capacity building co-operation may include technical assistance such as educational and 
training programmes to share experiences and best practice. 
 
 
Article 11 
 
Review of National Legislation 
 
In order to allow for the prosecution, conviction and punishment of those involved in 
piracy or armed robbery against ships, and to facilitate extradition or handing over when 
prosecution is not possible, each Participant intends to review its national legislation with a view 
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towards ensuring that there are national laws in place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, and adequate guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations, 
and prosecutions of alleged offenders.  
 
 
Article 12 
 
Dispute Settlement 
 
The Participants intend to settle by consultation and peaceful means amongst each other 
any disputes that arise from the implementation of this Code of conduct.  
 
 
Article 13 
 
Consultations 
 
Within two years of the effective date of this Code of conduct, and having designated the 
national focal points referred to in Article 8, the Participants intend to consult, with the assistance 
of IMO, with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement. 
 
 
Article 14 
 
Claims 
 
 Any claim for damages, injury or loss resulting from an operation carried out under this 
Code of conduct should be examined by the Participant whose authorities conducted the 
operation. If responsibility is established, the claim should be resolved in accordance with the 
national law of that Participant, and in a manner consistent with international law, including 
Article 106 and paragraph 3 of Article 110 of UNCLOS.   
 
 
Article 15 
 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
 
Nothing in this Code of conduct is intended to: 
 
(a) create or establish a binding agreement, except as noted in Article 13; 
 
(b) affect in any way the rules of international law pertaining to the competence of 
States to exercise investigative or enforcement jurisdiction on board ships not 
flying their flag; 
 
(c) affect the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for 
non-commercial purposes; 
 
(d) apply to or limit boarding of ships conducted by any Participant in accordance 
with international law, beyond the outer limit of any State’s territorial sea, 
including boardings based upon the right of visit, the rendering of assistance to 
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persons, ships and property in distress or peril, or an authorization from the flag 
State to take law enforcement or other action; 
 
(e) preclude the Participants from otherwise agreeing on operations or other forms of 
co-operation to repress piracy and armed robbery against ships; 
 
(f) prevent the Participants from taking additional measures to repress piracy and 
armed robbery at sea through appropriate actions in their land territory; 
 
(g) supersede any bilateral or multilateral agreement or other co-operative mechanism 
concluded by the Participants to repress piracy and armed robbery against ships; 
 
(h) alter the rights and privileges due to any individual in any legal proceeding;  
 
(i) create or establish any waiver of any rights that any Participant may have under 
international law to raise a claim with any other Participant through diplomatic 
channels; 
 
(j) entitle a Participant to undertake in the territory of another Participant the exercise 
of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for 
the authorities of that other Participant by its national law; 
 
(k) prejudice in any manner the positions and navigational rights and freedoms of any 
Participant regarding the international law of the sea;  
 
(l) be deemed a waiver, express or implied, of any of the privileges and immunities 
of the Participants to this Code of conduct as provided under international or 
national law; or 
 
(m) preclude or limit any Participant from requesting or granting assistance in 
accordance with the provisions of any applicable Mutual Legal Assistance 
Agreement or similar instrument. 
 
 
Article 16 
 
Signature and Effective Date 
  
1. The Code of conduct is open for signature by Participants on 29 January 2009 and at the 
Headquarters of IMO from 1 February 2009. 
 
2. The Code of conduct will become effective upon the date of signature by two or more 
Participants and effective for subsequent Participants upon their respective date of deposit of a 
signature instrument with the Secretary-General.  
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Article 17 
 
Languages 
 
This Code of conduct is established in the Arabic, English and French languages, each 
text being equally authentic. 
 DONE in Djibouti this twenty-ninth day of January two thousand and nine. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective 
Governments for that purpose, have signed this Code of conduct. 
 
S Signed (signatures omitted) in Djibouti on 29 January 2009 by Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, United Republic of 
Tanzania and Yemen. 
 
 
 
